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INTRODUCTION
Despite society's almost universal belief, epilepsy is not a single
disease. The impression etched into our consciousness by use of
the singular form is that only one disease exists and that it is char-
acterized by one set of symptoms: violent, recurrent, convulsive1
seizures acquired hereditarily.2 By producing this prejudicial
image, the singular form is inaccurate for understanding the disor-
der.3 As the phrase The Epilepsies suggests, the malady is a mani-
festation of multiple causes. Moreover, the conditions should not
even be characterized as a disease. 4 The epilepsies are a group of
* The author would like to extend his appreciation to Ray Schwartz,
MSW, Program Coordinator, Epilepsy Society of San Diego.
1. Interestingly, a 1974 Gallup poll question about respondents' knowl-
edge of the existence of epilepsy was phrased so as to refer to the convul-
sive nature of the disorder. The question read as follows: "Have you ever
heard or read about the disease called 'epilepsy' or convulsive seizures
(fits) ?" Hearings on H.R. 13405 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1974).
2. Many people admit they do not know the cause of epilepsy. Id. at
156. Of those who have expressed an opinion over a 25-year span, a range
of 12% to 19% said epilepsy was hereditary. The bulk of the remainder
said the "cause" was a brain or nervous disorder but did not indicate how
the disorder was acquired. Id. at 156.
3. The single form, i.e., epilepsy, will serve a valuable use in a more
limited and technical sense. The role is adequately stated in H. GASTAuT,
DIcTIONARY OF EPiLEPSY 8 (1973): In reference to etiology or the site of the
lesion, the term epilepsy should be used, but in common usage the word
epilepsies is more accurate and preferable.
Unfortunately, proper grammatical construction often hampers use of the
plural form. Consequently, in this paper the singular form will be used
in instances where the plural term is medically correct, but the singular
is grammatically preferable.
4. WEBsTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 403
(2d ed. 1972).
A disease is characterized by a particular destructive process in an organ
July 1976 Vol. 13 No. 4
[VOL. 13: 978, 1976] The Epilepsies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
neurological disorders.5 This fact has far-reaching import not
only in the medical community where, as a consequence, diagno-
sis, treatment, and cure remain fleetingly elusive, but also in the
public forum where community consciousness perceptibly influ-
ences most daily activities of epileptic individuals.
Medical discoveries have destroyed the myths: No single disease
exists; 6 not all seizures are convulsive; 7 epileptic people are neither
insane, incurable, nor degenerate;" many children outgrow the onset
of seizures; 9 seizures are controllable, 10 and thus, many epileptic
people lead normal, productive lives. These facts, only recently
uncovered, provide the framework for bridging the gap between
medical knowledge and social-legal response.
THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE EPILEPSIES
Epilepsies are neurological disorders caused by uncontrolled elec-
trical discharges in the brain." Whenever these discharges occur,
a person has a seizure. 12 When they strike, the patient becomes
unconscious, unaware of his actions 3 and loses control of bodily
or organism with a specific cause and characteristic symptom. Epileptic
disorders are of many types, and although each type may manifest charac-
teristic symptoms, there is no solid evidence that such symptoms are trig-
gered by a particular destructive process. Some researchers, however, be-
lieve that certain forms of the epilepsies are disease entities; see note 26
infra.
5. See text accompanying note 11 imfra.
6. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
7. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
8. See text accompanying note 64 infra.
9. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
10. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
11. J. SuTHELAND, H. TAT & M. EADIE, THE EpILEPsIEs, MODERN DIAGNosIs
AND TREATmENT 1-2 (2d ed. 1974).
12. "The most remarkable clinical characteristic of epilepsy is the discon-
tinuity of symptoms with widely varying intervals between attacks." R.
SCHMIDT & B. WILDER, EPILEPsY 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SCHM IDT].
13. Loss or impairment of consciousness is the most constant and
significant component of most types of epileptic seizures.... Many
variations in the length and depth of unconsciousness may exist.
At the one end of the scale is an impairment of flash-like brevity.
At the other end is a coma so profound that maximal sensory
stimulations will not arouse the patient. W. LENNOX, EPn.FrsY AD
REIATED DIsoRDERs 44 (1960) [hereinafter cited as LENNOX].
Consciousness, however, is not lost in every seizure or in every type of sei-
zure. "Retention of consciousness is the rule in Jacksonian autonomic,
sensory, and hallucinatory seizures. .. ." LENNOX 44.
movements. 14 Additionally, in certain instances he might be sub-
ject to convulsions.' 5 Although some seizures are quite dramatic
and severe,16 others are so slight they often go unnoticed.17 By
far the most visible and well-known epileptic seizure is the gran
mal,18 documented by writers as far back as 400 B.C.:
The patient loses his speech, and chokes, and foam issues by the
mouth, the teeth are fixed, the hands contracted, the eyes distorted,
he becomes insensible, and in some cases the bowels are evacu-
ated.19
Less severe types include petit mal seizures,20 myoclonic and
14. See notes 18, 21, 22, 23 infra.
15. Convulsive seizures commonly accompany a gran mal seizure. See
note 18 infra.
16. See note 18 infra.
17. See note 20 infra.
18. At the very start of the gran mal attack there may be an arrest
of activity and a brief stare prior to muscular contractions. The
sequence of motor events usually proceeds from tonic muscular
stiffening to clonic jerks. The body stiffens in opisthotonus (head
and heels are bent backwards and the body bowed forwards) and,
if erect, the patient falls. The arms may be flexed or extended,
usually the former, and the legs are extended.
With a severe and generalized tonic contraction at the onset, air
is forcibly exhaled through closed vocal cords, giving the "epileptic
cry" of peculiar and piercing quality. The bladder frequently emp-
ties either at this time or later after the motor seizure is over and
the patient has entered the state of post-convulsive stupor. The
stage of tonic muscle contraction gradually merges into one of
clonus, with at first just a diffuse trembling, followed by symmetri-
cal jerking and relaxation of the extremities. As the attack ends,
clonus slows in frequency and then ceases abruptly. The entire
process usually requires 2 minutes or less and seldom extends as
long as five minutes. SCMIDT 11.
19. HiPpocRATEs, On the Sacred Disease, in 10 GREAT Booxs OF THE
WESTEmR WoRL 156 (1952) [hereinafter cited as HIPPocRATEs].
20. Petit mal is classified into three types of seizures:
1. Simple petit mal spells. This is the most commonly encoun-
tered type of petit mal and consists essentially of sudden, va-
cant staring into space with occasional "rolling of the eyes back
into the head."
2. Petit mal spell with clonic movements. This spell consists of the
staring episode of simple petit mal with concomitant minor
clonic of the head and upper extremities.
3. Petit mal with automatisms. This seizure consists of staring
episodes of simple petit mal spells with associated automatisms
consisting usually of repetitious smacking of the lips, chewing
and swallowing movements and, occasionally, mumbling speech.
S. LIVINGSTON, CoMPREHENsIVE MANAGEMENT OF EPILEPsY IN IN-
FANCY, CHILDHOOD, AND ADOLESCENCE 56 (1972).
Another seizure similar to petit mal is the absence seizure:
Absences ... are of short duration rarely lasting more than a few
seconds. In these transient breaks in the continuity of conscious-
ness the patient, usually a child, behaves in the following charac-
teristic manner:
1. He abruptly ceases whatever he is doing-eating, playing or
talking.
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akinetic seizures, 21 Jacksonian seizures, 22 and psychomotor sei-
zures. 23 Any one of these can occur in conjunction with another.24
Moreover, the fact that a patient has exhibited only one type of
seizure does not preclude the occurrence of some other.25
The seizure types are manifestations of an underlying condition.2 6
2. He may "stare" ahead or roll his eyes upwards.
3. For some seconds he is non-responsive, neither speaking nor
understanding the spoken word.
4. Thereafter he continues with what he was doing before the at-
tack and may not be aware of the episode. J. SUTERLAI, H.
TAIT & M. EADIE, supra note 11, at 12.
Petit mal is distinguished from absences by its characteristic spike wave
action. See also J. PENNY, ABSENcE SEIZURES 133-35 (NINDS Monograph
No. 14, 1972).
21. Infantile myoclonic and akinetic are "lightning seizures" which affect
either consciousness or muscle control and movement. They can occur from
5 to 300 times a day and are seldom controlled by medication. Seizures
are sudden and last a short time. There can be sudden loss of conscious-
ness or muscle jerking and the face may turn red, white, or blue in color
for the duration of the seizure followed by loss of energy and interest in
surroundings. Infants may suddenly roll into a ball and have "colic" stare.
J. SUTHERLAND, H. TAIT & M. EADE, supra note 11, at 20.
22. The Jacksonian (or Bravais-Jackson) focal motor seizure con-
sists of motor movements which occur in an orderly sequence or
march. The movements involved are usually phasic or clonic in
nature, and the most common movement at outset is of the hand,
followed by that of the face and leg. In an idealized seizure, sel-
dom observed clinically, twitching might begin in the hand, spread
to the arm and face and down the leg to the foot. Seizures begin-
ning in the foot spread up the leg, down the arm and to the face.
SCMViT 22.
23. Psychomotor epilepsy is characterized by inappropriate movements
or bizarre behavior without the person realizing they are occurring. Ex-
amples include smacking the lips, sudden change in emotion to rage and
anger, sudden walking in circles or (quickly and without awareness) taking
off clothes, unbuttoning and rebuttoning clothes, rubbing arms, legs, hallu-
cinating, and other altered states of consciousness. Elapsed time is usually
10-15 minutes. See V. JANOVIcH, PsYCHOMOToR EPILEPsY; A PoLYDnVxN-
sIoNAL STUDy (1974).
24. Tyson, Children Suffer Also, More Have Epilepsy than Multiple
Sclerosis, Atlanta Journal, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13405, supra note
1, at 123. Ms. Tyson describes the seizures of Scott Waterman, age
16. Scott, who did not have a seizure until he was 12, undergoes three or
four different types of seizures and has as many as 30 to 40 seizures a
month. Id.
25. "Half of the patients who have absence seizures will eventually have
one or more grand mal seizures." J. PENRY, supra note 20, at 134.
26. Lennox is among those epileptomologists who hold that certain
forms of the epilepsies-petit mal variants-have disease characteristics
(see note 4 supra); however, he agrees the seizure per se is a symptom.
LENxox 52.
They are a consequence of a "conspiracy of causes"2 including 8
genetic influence and transmission;29 biochemical deficiencies; in-
fectious disorders (such as encephalitis) ;30 traumatic head injury;
prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal brain damage; congenital abnor-
malities and use of drugs or alcohol.31 In addition, any one of these
causes may give rise to one or more of the seizure types. Not sur-
prisingly, the possible combinations of cause and effect created by
multiple seizure types and multiple causes are an obstacle to diag-
nosis, treatment, control, and cure.
Everyone is potentially subject to an epileptic seizure.32 "Even
when none of the ... factors capable of producing epilepsy is
known to be present every living brain can still be made sufficiently
hyperexcitable to produce an epileptic sezure."33 This has a fright-
ening implication. A man or woman not genetically predisposed
to an epileptic disorder may someday suffer from one.3 4 For exam-
ple, seizures may be triggered by a head injury resulting from an
accident, or they may appear because a dormant biochemical defi-
ciency is awakened.
Generally, however, the epilepsies strike during the first two dec-
ades of life.35 Although many youngsters outgrow the onset of
27. Lennox coined this phrase in an attempt to counsel his colleagues to
look beyond the diagnosing of initial symptoms or causes. LENNOX 785.
28. "A list of etiologies will always be incomplete because of the
abundance of causes and the changing aspects of pathology and medicine."
E. NIEDERMEYER, COMPENDIUM or THE EPILEPSIEs 33 (1974).
29. J. MmETAKos & K. METRAKOs, GENETIC FACTORS IN THE EPILEPSIES
97-102; N. MYmIA oPouLos, MATERxAL FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK OF EPI-
LEPSY 103-107; P. BRAY, INHERITANCE OF FOCAL AND PETIT MAL SEIZURES 109-
12 (NINDS Monograph No. 14, 1972).
30. Fabing & Barrow, Medical Discovery as a Legal Catalyst: Mod-
ernization of Epilepsy Laws to Reflect Medical Progress, 50 Nw. U.L. REv.
42, 44 (1955).
31. E. NIEDERumYR, supra note 28. This volume is devoted to a compre-
hensive discussion of the etiologies of the epilepsies. See also R. BARuOW
& H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 15-18 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as BARROW]; ScmVnnT 44-67.
32. E. N EDERmEYER, supra note 28, at 33.
33. J. SUTERLAND, H. TAIT & M. EADIE, supra note 11, at 3.
34. In the new-born, trauma associated with birth, anoxic episodes,
infectious processes, inheritable disorders with primary alternations
of brain metabolism are frequent causes of chronic recurrent sei-
zures in early or late childhood. In the elderly, vascular or degen-
erative changes may result in focal or diffuse brain damage and
epilepsy. Throughout life, central nervous system infections, vas-
cular lesions, tumors and trauma can result in epilepsy. In some
kinds of epilepsy, such as progressive myoclonic epilepsy, inheri-
tance may be a factor. Hearings on H.R. 13405, supra note 1, at
91 (statement of Dr. Joe Wilder, Chief Neurological Services, V.A.
Hospital, Gainsville, Fla.).
35. "It is estimated that approximately 667,000 elementary school chil-
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seizures,8 6 rarely do they outgrow their stigma. Those who never
outgrow seizures forever carry a psychological as well as physical
burden. Furthermore, the epilepsies have an impact beyond that
suffered by the epileptic himself. There are an estimated 4,000,000
people in the United States today with a seizure problem.3 7 The
number of people affected by the epilepsies is four to five times
that amount.
38
Of the physical traumas that strike the human species, seizures
certainly must be the most frustrating to the individual. A per-
son healthy in every sense of the word becomes inescapably un-
healthy for a few minutes a day, a week, or a year. There is no
place to hide: The seizure strikes anywhere and everywhere. Only
occasionally, an aura39 provides warning of the impending seizure,
allowing the individual opportunity to suffer privately.40 Perhaps
most frustrating of all is that the individual does not know what
happened during the seizure.41 The only inkling something has
dren and 300,000 secondary school children have seizure disorders." S. REP.
No. 94-29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), in 1 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 593
(1975). The greatest incidence of epilepsy is in children. Hearings on H. R.
13405, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Dr. David D. Daley, President, In-
ternational League Against Epilepsy).
36. J. PENRY, supra note 20, at 134; BAROW 24.
37. Hearings on 13405, supra note 1, at 36 (statement of Paul E. Funk,
Executive Vice President, Epilepsy Foundation of America). "Current esti-
mates are that 1 to 2 percent of all Americans are affected by epilepsy,
making it a health problem of national concern." S. REP. No. 94-29 (94th
Cong., 1st Sess.) (1975), in 1 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 593 (1975).
38. An estimated 4,000,000 Americans experience recurrent seizures. Id.
Family members-fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, brothers, and sisters-
increase greatly the number intimately affected by the disorder. In 1966,
Barrow estimated the number directly affected by a person with seizure
predisposition at 8,000,000. However, this estimate was predicated on an
estimate of 2,000,000 epileptics. BARROW 5. On a world scale, the frequency
and severity of the disorder and those affected by it are even greater than
in the United States. GASTAUT, supra note 3, at 7.
39. Aura is a Latin word meaning wind. The term was first applied
by Galen, a Roman physician who lived in the second century after
Christ, and who spoke of this warning as a wind passing up the
extremities. The aura may be but a few seconds in duration, or
it may last for many minutes. Observers may note pallor, restless-
ness, anxiety, or muscle twitching during the aura. The patient
usually describes it as a "sick feeling" in the abdomen, a "queer
feeling," or "dizziness," or "numbness," or "fear." The most com-
mon aura is an abdominal sensation of nausea or bloating. BAR-
ROW 11. See also LwN ox 174-82.
40. Auras occur in more than half of all recurrent convulsions. BARROW
11.
41. See note 13 supra.
been amiss may be the presence of a physical injury.42 The epilep-
tic individual lives in a twilight zone from which escape is uncer-
tain.
As a disorder, the epilepsies were known throughout history.
4 3
Hammurabi recognized their existence in his law codes. 44 Plato did
so in his Laws.45 Hippocrates 46 devoted an entire essay to their
nature.47 They are described in the Bible.48  And recently they
have been discussed in congressional chambers.49 Astonishingly,
throughout 4,100 years of history, little has changed. Although we
have learned more about the epilepsies during the last forty-five
42. If you are present during a seizure: (1) Try to prevent the person's
falling or hitting against something that could cause injury. (2) Place a
soft object, such as a handkerchief, between the teeth to prevent the person
from biting his or her tongue. (Do not attempt to force it, and do not insert
any hard object, such as a pencil, which could itself cause serious injury.)
(3) Stay with the person until the seizure is over. (4) Afterward, allow
the person to become reoriented and then, if the person is an adult, ask
what-if anything-you can do. (5) If he or she is a child, notify the par-
ents or physician. Schultz, Four Million Americans Should Not Have to
Lie About Their Health, TODAY'S HEALTH, Sept. 1975, at 16.
43. ScHMIDT 2.
44. 0. TEmI:w, THE FALLING ScKNF.ss 47 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as Tkmn K].
45. PLATO, LAWS 454 (Penquin ed. 1970).
46. Biographical Note, HIPPOCRATEs IX. The early Greek medical trea-
tises, which were brought together by the Alexandrian scholars of the third
century, are attributed to Hippocrates.
47. The essay is entitled On the Sacred Disease. HIPPoCRATES 154.
48. Mark 9:14-29 (King James). Temkin Describes the episode in Mark,
indicating that the story furthered the notion that epileptic seizures were
the work of the devil. TEmKIn 91.
49. Hearings on H. R. 13405, supra note 1. During the 94th Congress, leg-
islation was passed authorizing the Secretary of HEW to establish a Com-
mission for the Control of Epilepsy and its Consequences. The duty of the
commission will be to:
1. make a comprehensive study of the medical and social manage-
ment of the epilepsies in the United States;
2. investigate and make recommendations concerning the proper
roles of Federal and State governments and national and local
public and private agencies in research, prevention, identifica-
tion, treatment, and rehabilitation of persons with epilepsy;
3. develop a comprehensive national plan for the control of epi-
lepsy and its consequences based on the most thorough, com-
plete, and accurate data and information available on the dis-
order; and
4. transmit to the President and the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare of the Senate and the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, not
later than one year after the date of enactment of the Act, a
report detailing the findings and conclusions of the Commission,
together with recommendations for legislation and appropria-
tions, as it deems advisable.
S. REP. No. 94-29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), in 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 593-94 (1975).
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years than in the combined centuries of the past,50 we struggle with
the identical problem essayed by Hippocrates: the adjustment of
social response to medical fact.51
Society's growing awareness of the epilepsies' existence and its
slowly changing attitude toward them are a distinctly recent phe-
nomenon. In Hippocrates' day the predominant response to wit-
nessing an attack or seizure was fear, shame, or pity.5 2 The Romans
spit on the epileptic person to throw back the contagion.53 A sei-
zure was considered the work of either gods or demons.54 In pre-
Christian days the disorder became known as the "Sacred Disease,"
most probably because the populace believed that the individual
was possessed by a higher power, and thus cure lay in the super-
natural.55 During the Middle Ages, a seizure was considered a de-
monic possession controlled by the moon. 6
Medical men have been more pragmatic. To them, the disorder
was neither supernatural nor sacred. Hippocrates believed the
"disease" to be hereditary 7 with its cause located in the brain.58
50. BAPmow 10. During the ten years since the publication of the Barrow
and Fabing book, medical research into the epilepsies has continued with
vigor.
51. The essay takes exception to the common notion of the time that epi-
leptic seizures were caused by either gods or demons and sets forth the
hypothesis that seizures are hereditary, caused by disorders in the brain.
HIPPocRATEs 154.
52. LENNOX 40; TEMINm 9.
53. TEwKI 8.
54. Id. at 7; HIPPOCRATES 155. The following quotation exhibits the pre-%
vailing attitude of the ancients:
For if they imitate a goat, or grind their teeth, or if their right side
be convulsed, they say that the mother of the gods is the cause.
But if they speak in a sharper more intense tone, they resemble
this state to a horse, and say that Poseidon is the cause. Or if any
excrement be passed, which is often the case, owing to the violence
of the disease, the appellation of Enodia is adhibited; or, if it be
passed in smaller and denser masses, like birds, it is said to be from
Apollo Namius. But if foam be emitted by the mouth, and the pa-
tient kick with his feet, Ares then gets the blame. But terrors
which happen during the night, and fevers, and delirium, and
jumpings out of bed, and frightful, and fleeing away, all these they
hold to be the plots of Hecate .... Id.
55. TEaN 7.
56. Id. at 95-98, describing the effects of the moon and the influence of
the devil.
57. HIIPPOCRATES 155.
58. Id. at 156.
Galen5 9 thought the "disease" originated either in the brain or in
irritating sources brought to it from the body.00 This attitudinal
dichotomy persists today. To doctors, seizures are a medical
symptom: To laypeople, seizures are a social dilemma.
Treatment of the disorder, from the Greeks to the Middle Ages,
was a chaotic combination of the supernatural and the physical.0 1
Thousands of years before today's wonder drugs, medical practition-
ers experimented with a myriad of remedies commonly used for
other maladies: bloodletting, hygiene and diet control, potions and
herbs. 62 The lay populace added sacrifices, gifts, prayer, and exor-
cism. 63  Ineffectiveness of both approaches apparently confirmed
the already pervasive assessment that the epileptic person was in-
curable, degenerate, and insane. This belief resulted "in an attitude
of defeatism among doctors and in social ostracism of the epileptic
by the general public."
64
By the late 1800's, however, the underpinnings supporting the
conclusion of impotency and helplessness in medical treatment were
quietly being upset by the work of dedicated clinicians. Bravais,06
Bright,6 6 Jackson, 67 and Gowers 6s clarified the mechanisms and
characteristics of epileptic disorders. Their work was given impetus
by the discovery that potassium bromide to an extent controls sei-
zures.69 Introduction of the drug phenobarbital in 1912 provided
59. Biographical Note to GALEN, On the Natural Faculties, in 10 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 163 (1952).
60. LENNOX 14-15.
61. Id. at 18-25.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 34.
65. Bravais initially studied and observed what has come to be described
as "Jacksonian" epilepsy; i.e., those seizures which begin in one part of the
body and travel to another. He made no attempt to explain his observa-
tions. TEmIKn 305.
66. Bright combined the clinical and the anatomical approach, reaching
conclusions concerning changes that occur in the cortex of the cerebral hem-
ispheres. Id. at 307.
67. Jackson is considered the premier clinician of his time. He docu-
mented four causes of unilateral convulsions:
A. the seat of the internal lesion;
B. the functional nature of the change in the muscle area affected-
C. the pathological process which brought about the functional
change; and
D. the circumstances which determine the paroxysm. Id. at 328.
68. W. GowERs, EPILEPsY AND OTHER CHRoNIc DISEASES: THEm CAUSES,
SYMPTOMS & TREATMENT (1885). This work is considered a classic in its
field. Although his comments on therapy are partially outmoded, his prin-
ciples of patient care and management are still valid.
69. ScmvIDT 142.
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a more effective method of seizure control.7 0 Then in 1929, another
breakthrough occurred. Hans Berger, a German researcher, in-
vented the electroencephalograph, the so-called brain-wave ma-
chine,7 1 which permitted the first electrical recording of an epileptic
discharge. It has since become an indispensable tool in diagnosis,
treatment, and research 7 2 enabling medical understanding of the
epilepsies to flourish. This increased clinical knowledge, coupled
with further advances in drug therapy 73 formed the foundation for
a concept about the epilepsies far different from that which was
in vogue one hundred years ago: The epilepsies are manageable!
Today, proper treatment with anti-convulsive drugs results in sei-
zure control in eighty per cent of the known epileptic population.
7 4
The success of anti-convulsant drugs in controlling seizures has dra-
matically changed the lives of epileptic men and women. Most epi-
leptic people are now capable of leading useful and normal lives.
No longer are the physical miseries of the past a constant shackle.
Freedom from seizures has created new horizons, simple, yet essen-
tial to the spirit. To work without anxiety or fear, to be self-suf-
ficient and productive, to be a member of the mainstream of
society are the once impossible goals now achievable as a result of
medical advances.
CONTINUING THE ADJUSTMENT OF SOCIAL
RESPONSE TO MEDICAL FACT
The Dilemma
Significant medical advancements in diagnosis and treatment of
the epilepsies did not occur until early in this century.75 Reflecting
this latter-day wave of medical achievements, society only recently
has endeavored to alter attitudes toward the epileptic individual.
70. Id.
71. BARROW 19.
72. Id. at 20.
73. For a brief introduction to drug therapy, see EPILEPsY SocIrz OF
SAN DIEGO, Ax EPILEPSY MEDICATION HANDBOOK (1975). For an in-depth
treatment of drug therapy, see AL EADIE & J. TYRE, ANTICONVULSANT
THERAPY (1974); S. LIVINGSTON, DRUG THERAPY FOR EPILEPSY (1966).
74. Seizures are totally controlled in 50 per cent of all epileptics. Seizure
frequency is reduced substantially in another 25 to 30 per cent of the epi-
leptic population. BARROW 25; GASTAUT, supra note 3, at 7; Scmv=n 142.
75. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
Dramatic social change came with publication in 1956 of Epilepsy
and the Law, authored by Roscoe L. Barrow and Howard D. Fa-
bing.76 More than any other work, Epilepsy and the Law convinc-
ingly penetrated the shrouded myths encircling this enigmatic dis-
order and forced legislators throughout the country to reconsider
and re-evaluate archaic laws governing the lives of epileptic peo-
ple.77 For example as late as 1955, eighteen states prohibited epi-
leptics from marrying,78 and nineteen states provided for their ster-
ilization.79 Today, no state restricts an epileptic's right to marry,80
but six states continue to authorize eugenic sterilizations. 81 How-
ever, although at the time legislatures responded quickly to Bar-
row's and Fabing's proposals, reform has not proceeded at a
constant and expected pace. In many respects, the movement to
establish and effectuate the rights of epileptic people has been
stalled or side-tracked.
76. R. BARRow & H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW (1956). Since the
original publication, a second edition of Epilepsy and the Law has been
published. All references in this article are to the second edition. See note
31 supra.
77. This searching re-examination prompted then Chief Justice Earl War-
ren to write: "Epilepsy and the Law probably caused more legislatures
to amend more laws in a shorter period of time than any other similar re-
search project of the past two decades." BARRow AND FABING, Preface to
BARRow IX.
78. Fabing & Barrow, Medical Discovery as a Legal Catalyst: Mod-
ernization of Epilepsy Laws to Reflect Medical Progress, 50 Nw. U.L. REv.
42, 46 (1955). By December 1964, this number had been reduced to four:
Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. The eugenic mar-
riage statutes in these states have since been repealed.
79. Id. at 53. Generally as a requisite for application of the eugenic
sterilization laws, it must appear that the epileptic would produce children
with a tendency to epilepsy. Statutes specifying this criterion may also in-
clude other criteria based on therapeutic and social motives, such as
whether the operation would be in the best interest of the patient and
whether the children of the epileptic are likely to become a public charge.
Frequently, criteria are expressed in broad terms, such as whether procrea-
tion by the epileptic would be harmful to society or against the public inter-
est. Id.
For a recent compilation of present eugenic sterilization laws, see
Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation,
14 J. FAm. L. 280 (1975). See also Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded:
A Problem or a Solution, 62 CALir. L. REV. 917 (1974).
80. See note 78 supra.
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 145.2,
145.9 (1972) (These sections provide for the sterilization of peo-
ple who are mentally ill or retarded, syphilitic, habitually criminal, morally
degenerate, or sexually perverted and who are a menace to society if pro-
creation by such persons would produce a child having an inherited ten-
dency to epilepsy); Mss. CODE ANN. § 6957 (1942); OKLA. STATS. ANN.,
tit. 43A, § 341 (1954); S.C. CODE OF LAws tit. 32, § 671 (1962); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-10-1 (1961).
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In general, the phenomenon affecting epileptics is akin to that
affecting our nation's soul-wrenching experience with desegrega-
tion. The rights recognized with the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education 2 and its progeny8 3 have become the
conventional wisdom. 4 Tangible changes from a previously incor-
rect social-legal course were expressed in law.8 5 These hard won
rights, however, gave rise to new expectations-logical and reason-
able corollaries of the initial rights. For instance, destruction of
the "separate but equal" doctrine fulfilled a great expectation for
Blacks. With its destruction rose a simultaneous belief that truly
equal education for Black children, as well as for other children,
lay in the near future. However, today, twenty-two years later,
amid the bussing controversy, access to the right of equal education
remains disputed.8 6 The right itself is written in bold relief on the
pages of our case law and statute books, but its effectuation in
many quarters remains an unfulfilled hope at the crux of an ex-
hausting battle.
A strikingly similar pattern emerges in the endeavor to bring
about necessary change in the relationship between society and epi-
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
83. Brown v. Board of Education held that the "separate but equal" doc-
trine was unconstitutional because it denied Black students of the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The effect
of Brown was to make illegal de jure desegregation. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
prohibited racial discrimination in the public schools of the District of Co-
lumbia. Other cases upholding the Brown decision include Pennsylvania
v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1956) (action of Board of Directors of
City Trusts, in refusing under terms of testimentary trust, to admit Blacks
to school established by trust was state action amounting to unconstitu-
tional racial discrimination); and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (right
not to be discriminated against cannot be nullified by evasive schemes of
state executive or legislative officers). For a list of some of the cases in
this area, see 38 A.L.R.2d L.C.S. 1188 (1969).
84. "The unanimous decision of the court in the recent school cases thus
represents the law of the land for today, tomorrow and, I am convinced,
for the future-for all regions and for all people." At the time this state-
ment was made Mr. Rogers was the Attorney General of the United States.
Rogers, Desegregation in the Schools: The Citizens Responsibility, 45 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 488, 490.
85. Id.; see note 83 supra.
86. Brown v. Board of Education made illegal de jure desegregation. The
issue of de facto desegregation is another matter. For a comment on this
issue and a compilation of recent cases, see 11 A.L.R.3d 780 (1967).
leptic men and women. Original expectations have been met. Ana-
chronistic laws preventing marriage have perished.8" Most laws
condoning sterilization have been repealed."" Other laws have
changed as well. All states provide some mechanism for allowing
an epileptic to obtain a driver's license.8 9 Worker's compensation
laws now generally provide for "second injury funds"90 which os-
tensibly foster the hiring of epileptics. But these changes have
given rise to logical and reasonable corollaries that, as yet, remain
unrealized. For example, changes in the worker's compensation
laws have not avoided vexatious discrimination in hiring. 1 Similar
unnecessary discriminations are present in both driver licensing
laws92 and adoption procedures
3
This Note will analyze the extent to which societal reform con-
tinues in California as reflected by its laws, rules, and regulations.
Discussion will highlight two basic components of society's struc-
ture: the family and civil liability.
The Family
The Epileptic's Right: Choosing to Marry and Raise Children
In California, an epileptic person's right to marry, have children,
and raise a family has never been denied or restricted by legislative
act, administrative regulation, or case rule. 4 Legislators and
judges, acting with due restraint, avoided intrusions into inherently
private conduct, recognizing forthrightly that the choice of a mate
and the decision to have a child are matters beyond their legislative
87. See note 78 supra.
88. See note 81 supra.
89. BARROW 57-58.
90. BARRow 90-116.
91. Unemployment among epileptics is six times higher than the national
average. S. REP. No. 99-29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), in 1 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593 (1975).
California has attempted to overcome discriminatory practices in hiring
with the passage of the Fair Employment Practices Act. CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 1410 et seq. (West 1971). The epileptic falls within the definition of the
physically handicapped and is benefitted by this new legislation. CAL. LA-
BOR CODE § 1413H (West Supp. 1975).
92. See note 231 infra.
93. See text accompanying notes 158-200 infra.
94. Other states in the recent past had eugenic marriage laws. See note
78 supra. Eugenic sterilization laws still exist in a minority of states. See
note 81 supra. Neither eugenic marriage laws nor eugenic sterilization laws
have been a part of California's legal heritage. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645
(West 1970) provides for the sterilization of certain sex offenders; however,
it does not discriminate against epileptic persons. For an in-depth discus-
sion of eugenic marriage and sterilization laws as they relate to the epilep-
tic person, see BARRow 30-42.
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and judicial cognizance. 95 This posture has been bolstered by the
United States Supreme Court opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut,96
Roe v. Wade,97 and Loving v. Virginia9  Marriage, marital privacy,
and biological parenthood are significant rights within the Consti-
tution's protective mantle. 99
95. The status of California law on this issue reflects the sentiments ex-
pressed by Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-
96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring):
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the
right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these
fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no particular pro-
visions of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupt-
ing the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization-surely does not show that
the Government was meant to have the power to do so. Rather,
as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are funda-
mental personal rights such as this one, which are protected from
abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution.
See also Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 106, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (1947),
quoting 39 Am. JuR. 597, 594 (1942). "So fundamental are the rights
of parenthood that infringements thereof have been held to constitute an
encroachment on the personal liberty of the parent forbidden by the Consti-
tution."
96. 381U.S. 479 (1964).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
98. 388 U.S.1 (1966).
99. In Griswold, the Court indicated there were zones of privacy emanat-
ing from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. It further indicated
the marital relation to an undefined extent fell within such zones. Al-
though it was the privacy of the husband-wife relationship which the Court
spoke about, the case has ramifications for the parent-child relationship. As
noted by Justice Goldberg:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that already
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to mari-
tal privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order
and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.
381 U.S. at 495-96 (concurring opinion).
In Loving, the Court struck down an anti-miscegenation statute as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. As Chief Jus-
tice Warren said: "Marriage is one of 'the basic civil rights of man'; funda-
mental to our very existence and survival." 388 U.S. at 12. In addition, the
Court as far back as 1942 indicated marriage was fundamental. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The Court has also indicated that parenthood is a significant right. In
Roe, the Court held that state criminal abortion laws which except from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without re-
gard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment, which protects against state action
the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy. The decision to terminate a pregnancy in its first trimester is
In all but exceptional cases, the state is powerless to deny people
the right to procreate.100 However, when the decision to have a
child is made, both legislative and common law duties attach to
the relationships formed.10' For example, when a child is abused
or neglected by its parent, the state may intervene to sever or alter
the parent-child relationship. 02 Thus, the significant right to
choose biological parenthood does not translate into an absolute
right to raise the child. 0 3 Between these two rights exist a num-
made by the pregnant woman and her attending physician. During this
period the state is powerless to intervene. 410 U.S. at 164. In Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court held that a biological parent cannot
be denied the right of raising his child without a showing of the parent's
unfitness. Accord, Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947).
100. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), held it is not a violation of the
equal protection laws for state officials under a state statute to sterilize
a feeble-minded person. Bell is still controlling precedent; see In re Cavitt,
182 Nev. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968). Thus, a category of people exists who
are subject to deprivation of the right to choose procreation. In Bell the
Court used the rational relation test. 274 U.S. at 207. In 1942, however,
the standard of review was elevated to strict scrutiny. In Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court said:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize ... may have...
devastating effects .... There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches .... He is forever deprived of a basic lib-
erty.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), applied the same test to mari-
tal privacy; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), applied the same test to
a mother's right to obtain an abortion within the first trimester; and Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), applied the same test to the right to marry.
These recent cases clearly appear to undermine Bell. Furthermore courts
are becoming increasingly strict in allowing sterilizations even of the men-
tally retarded. See Wyatt v. Adderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ala. 1973);
Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). See generally
Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or A Solution, 62
CALir. L. Rsv. 917 (1974); Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A
Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J. FAm. LAW, 280 (1975).
101. Lewis v. Lewis, 174 Cal. 336, 339, 163 P. 42, 44 (1917) (A parent's
duty to support his minor child rests on fundamental natural law, and has
always been recognized by the courts in the absence of any statutory provi-
sion.); Fox v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 173, 228 P. 38. (parents are
under a common law duty to support and educate their children); CAL. CiV.
CoDE § 203 (West 1954) (civil remedy for parental abuse of a child); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 273a, 273d (West 1970) (criminal penalties for physical
abuse of a child); CAL. PENAL CODE § 271a (West 1970) (criminal penalties
for abandonment of a child). See generally 37 CAL. Jun. 2d Parent and
Child § 19 (1957). As to the reciprocal duties owed by a husband and wife
toward one another, see generally 26 CAL. JuR. 2d Husband and Wife §§
17-53 (1956).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 193-215 (West 1954).
103. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme Court held
a statute which declared an unwed father's child a state ward unconstitu-
tional because it violated the equal protection clause and the due process
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ber of legislatively created proceedings designed to establish a state-
decreed parent-child relationship. 04 Among these proceedings are
the child custody hearing and the adoption proceeding. Obviously,
the paramount question facing epileptic people involved in such
proceedings is how their disorder will affect the outcome.
The Epileptic and the State-Decreed Family
Custody hearings and adoption proceedings are legal procedures
for deciding who should be assigned the opportunity and task of
being a child's parent 0 5 Although they differ in some aspects,0 6
the goal of both proceedings is similar: to reconcile the competing
and conflicting interests of the parties 07 in order to serve the "best
clause. This holding indicates biological parents have first right to raise
their child. However, upon a showing of the parent's unfitness, the state
may act to remove the child from the parent. Id. at 649. As to the termina-
tion of parental rights, see generally V. DEFRANcIs, TERMINATION OF PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS-BALANCING THE EQUITIES (1971); H. SnmoNs, PROTECTIVE
SERVICES FOR CmIM)R1E (1968); E. BROWNE, CHILD NEGLECT AND DEPEN-
DENCY: A DIGEST OF CASE LAw (1973); W. SERIDAN, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR
DRAFTING FAmILY AND JUVENILE COURT ACTS (Children's Bureau Pub. No.
472, 1969); T. BECKER, DUE PROCESS AND CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
STATE INTERVENTION IN FAmILy RELATIONS ON BEHALF OF NEGLECTED CHIL-
DREN (1971); Sutton, Parents Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect
Proceedings, 49 IND. L.J. 167 (1973).
104. The phrase "state decreed parent-child relationship" is used for two
reasons: first, to distinguish custody hearings, adoption proceedings, and
the like from the typical biological family; and, second, to designate those
proceedings in which the court or an administrative agency creates or sanc-
tions the new parent-child relationship.
105. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 5 (1973).
106. State-initiated custody proceedings fall into two broad categories,
termination of parental rights and dependency or neglect proceedings. The
difference between these two categories is primarily in the permanence and
scope of the result. Termination involves the formal and permanent depri-
vation of all the traditional rights and duties of a parent, including those
involved with custody, control, inheritance, and support. Termination
usually arises in the context of adoption. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 224 (West 1954).
Dependency and neglect, in contrast, are both considered temporary and
generally affect only rights to custody and control of children, not all un-
derlying legal rights. Nevertheless, an adjudication of dependency or ne-
glect can result in taking the child from the parents' custody and placing
him in an institution for children or in a foster home-a step which may
have a lasting detrimental effect on the family. See note 103 supra.
107. Besides the state, the parties to a child placement hearing are the
child, the present custodian, and the prospective custodian. As to the right
of a child to be independently represented in any such hearing, see J. GOLD-
interests of the child."'10  Because significant changes have oc-
curred recently in the adoption laws concerning epileptics, the sub-
sequent analysis is set in the adoption context with comparisons
made as needed to the custody proceeding. In addition, the adop-
tion proceeding itself will be analyzed from two perspectives: the
perspective of an epileptic child available for adoption and the per-
spective of an epileptic parent who desires to adopt.
The Epileptic Child
In California, the requisite tasks necessary to place a child effec-
tively are performed by both public and private agencies. 10 Essen-
tially, their charge is to find a family acceptable to agency standards
and willing to serve the child's needs." 0 Although it is harder to
achieve, this goal is no less important for the epileptic child than
for the "healthy" child. Except for the actual occurrence of a sei-
zure, the epileptic child is healthy. More often than not seizures
are controllable with proper medication. Nevertheless, under exist-
ing legislation the epileptic child is defined as handicapped."' Con-
sequently, throughout this Note the words epileptic and handi-
capped are used interchangeably.
Not long ago agencies had to "sell the country on adoption.""12
Recruiting adoptive parents was necessary because society in gen-
eral looked unfavorably on adoption and on the adoption process."n
sTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 105, at 64. See Sutton, supra
note 103, as to a parent's right to counsel in dependency and neglect proceed-
ings.
108. Although the goal is "the best interests of the child," there is consid-
erable controversy over what constitutes this interest. See generally Katz,
Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application
of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MicH. L. Rzv. 145 (1966);
Children and the Law-A Symposium, Child Placement: Law and Theory,
20 CATHoLIc LAw. 85 (1974); Recent Trends in California Law Concerning
the Best Interests of the Child, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 89 (1973).
Furthermore, there is controversy whether the concept of the child's best
interest is itself a proper goal. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOLNIT, supra note 105.
109. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE § 30517 et seq.
110. Katz, supra note 108, at 154.
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 250.5 (West 1970); 17 CAL. ADM.
CODE § 2901 (1975).
112. Reid, Principles, Values, and Assumptions Underlying Adoption
Practice, in SocIAL Woax IN ADoPTION 1, 5 (1971); CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATIsTIcs, TEN YEAR TRENDS IN THE ADOPTION PROGRAMS IN CAL-
IFORNIA (Rep. No. 341-0472-501, 2 (1973)) (on file in the office of the San
Diego Law Review).
113. "Attitudes toward illegitimacy, toward bringing children of different
blood into the family set up strong barriers to adoption." Reid, supra note
112, at 5.
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Consequently, many social workers believed adoptive parents were
doing the child and the agency a favor by accepting a homeless
child.1 14 This situation engendered the "Blue Ribbon Attitude"
that agencies would provide only healthy, "perfect" children.
115
Thus, a premise developed that was seriously detrimental to the
handicapped child:
It was in the best interests of the child for him to be perfect and
to match perfectly with a family. If the child was imperfect, if
his physical defects or emotional difficulties would make it difficult
for him to be accepted by the adoptive family, he was in a sense
unadoptable and it was better for him to be raised in a form of
foster care other than adoption." 16
Because of the child's handicap, prospective parents shied away
from accepting the added financial strain and emotional commit-
ment which they perceived would accompany such adoptions."
7
This attitude, which still prevails,"18 stems from a deep-rooted soci-
etal prejudice against the ill and infirm.1 19
In the past, this predisposition, coupled with agency practices,
often deprived the handicapped child of a home. For the epileptic
child, the obstacles to an early, stable, and final placement were
even greater than those for other handicapped children. An adop-
tion could be vacated if the child gave indications of being feeble
minded, epileptic, or insane as the result of pre-existing conditions
of which the parents had no knowledge. 12 0 Thus, a child who mani-
114. Reid, supra note 112, at 5.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. This point may be highlighted by the fact that the preference among
prospective parents is to adopt healthy white infants. As Kadushin notes:
"According to the Child Welfare League, in 1971 there were 133 approved
adoptive homes available for every 100 white adoptive children, but only
71 approved homes for 100 non-white children." A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WEL-
FARE SERvrcEs 528 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KADUSHIN].
118. Id.
119. The ill and infirm are treated differently in our society. For an in-
depth analysis of the problem and the ways in which a handicapped person
may cope, see B. WRIGHT, PHYSIcAL DISAILrY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
(1960). For a legal analysis of issues facing handicapped persons, see M.
Burgdorf & R. Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Quali-
fications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 855 (1975).
120. Cal. Stats., c. 531, p. 1523, § 1 (1947), as amended CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 227b (West Supp. 1975).
Arkansas, Iowa and Missouri still retain a statute which permits the vaca-
fested seizures after adoption could be returned to state custodial
care. Such a child was destined to remain unadoptable although
contemporary medicine could control epileptic seizures. Therefore,
by legislative action, an adopted epileptic child could be legally con-
strained from leading a normal family life.
Our cultural preferences are such that society believes a child
is best reared in a nuclear family.121 Accordingly, strenuous ef-
forts have always been made to protect these relationships once
they have been formed.122 Nevertheless, little has been done to
cultivate these relationships for the handicapped, hard-to-place
child. In recent years, however, agency philosophy has been modi-
fied to overcome this deficiency. 23 Furthermore, a shift in social
attitude124 fostered by aggressive legislative action 25 has abrogated
the restrictive policies of the past. Adoption is no longer frowned
upon by the public. In fact, it is seen as a highly satisfactory alter-
native to raising one's own children. 20 With this shift in attitude,
there has been a commensurate rise in the number of adoptive ap-
plicants.127 Simultaneously, the number of children available for
adoption has been decreasing steadily.128 The high applicant-to-
child ratio has provided agencies with a reservoir of prospective
tion of an adoption where the child is discovered to be epileptic. Anx.
STAT. ANN. § 56-110 (1971); IOWA CODE § 600.7 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 453.130 (1952).
121. "One of the most important principles of child welfare, and one orig-
inal to this field, is the significance to the child of having his own mother
and father." D. HUTcHINsON, CHERISH THE CILD 26 (1974). See also Katz,
supra note 108, at 154.
122. See note 101 supra.
123. See text accompanying note 131 infra.
124. See text accompanying note 126 infra.
125. See text accompanying note 136 infra.
126. At the same time, the potential demand for adoption increased
as the large numbers of children born in the late 1940's and early
1950's began reaching the age of adoptive application and concern
with population increase led to growing acceptance of adoption by
fertile couples who deliberately choose not to bear their own chil-dren. A poll conducted in 1971 by a Presidential Conmission on
Population Growth found that 56 percent of respondents indicatedthey would consider adopting a child if they already had two
children and wanted a larger family. KAD uSH 527.
127. Id.
128. The principal factor in the decrease of white, nonhandicapped
children available for adoption is the greater availability of contra-
ception and abortion, as a consequence of which the rise in illegiti-
mate births has been slowed and, in some places, reversed. More
significant, fewer unmarried mothers give up their babies for adop-
tion, because more adequate social services enable more of them
to keep and raise their children, while the stigma attached to un-
married motherhood is fading. Interestingly enough, the same
factors are also reducing the number of children available for adop-
tion abroad. Id.
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parents.129 This fact alone stimulates activity to place handicapped
children. 130 Because agency philosophy has also changed, most
children are considered adoptable.' 3 '
Notwithstanding these changes, a vestige of the social prejudice
against adopting a handicapped child has endured. The preference
among prospective parents is for a healthy, white infant. 32 This
129. Changes in supply and demand are summarized in the ratio statis-
tics: In 1958 there were 158 applicants for every 100 children available;
in 1962, 129 applicants for every 100 children available; in 1967, 104 appli-
cants; in 1970, 150 applicants; in 1971, 200 applicants for every 100 children
available. Id.
130. Another factor stimulating the adoption of handicapped or hard-to-
place children is the unavailability of healthy white children. As Kadushin
notes: "Diminished availability of white, non-handicapped children in-
creased the demand for, and placeability of, all 'children with special needs'
and in 1970 'about three-fourths of the agencies report[ed] that they have
put greater emphasis on adoption planning for nonwhite children."' KADU-
sHN 528.
131. The goal is the creation of a successful parent-child relationship be-
tween the adopted child and his new parent. To this end, active effort is
made to place the handicapped. In Department of Social Welfare v. Supe-
rior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 1, 459 P.2d 897, 81 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1969), the court
stated: 'The main purpose of such statutes is the promotion of the weifare
of children 'by the legal recognition and regulation of the consummation
of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and
child.'" Id. at 6, 459 P.2d at 899, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (1969). See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 221 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). Section 227 in intent is virtually the
same now as it was in 1872. CAL. CIv. CODE § 227 (West 1954). It provides
that the judge be satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by
the adoption. Section 226 provides that the State Department of Social
Welfare-in cases in which the natural parents consent to the adoption is
needed-must ascertain whether the child is a proper subject for adoption
and whether the proposed home is suitable for the child. In all cases where
the consent of the natural parents is not required, the State Department
of Social Welfare will file its consent with the court. "Such consent shall
not be given... unless the child's welfare will be promoted by the adop-
tion." CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.3 (West Supp. 1976). See generally Presser,
The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAm.
LAw 443 (1971).
At a minimum, the basic goals of the parent-child relationship include:
maintaining an orderly, stable, and loyal relationship so that the govern-
ment will not be required to intervene in that relationship; providing a fi-
nancial base which will enable a child to mature into a healthy adult and
to acquire the skills necessary to participate in and contribute to the eco-
nomic processes of society; nurturing the child's physical and emotional
safety, health, and comfort; providing a child with guidance and the oppor-
tunity for educational development; teaching a child respect for his parents,
other authorities, and all human beings; and training a child in social re-
sponsibilities. Katz, supra note 108, at 168-69.
132. See note 117 supra.
preference is so strong that in many instances the waiting time from
application until placement is approximately one year.13 3 In effect,
two distinct populations of adoptable children exist: the preferred
infant and the less preferred older or handicapped child.18 4 The
handicapped child remains disadvantaged and often unadoptable.
Realizing 35 that state failure to remove the barriers confronting
handicapped children seriously impeded placement, the California
legislature recently enacted two laws. 30 The purpose of the pro-
grams created by these laws is to alleviate the financial and emo-
tional stress created when the new parent-child relationship is
formed.137 The epileptic child is a beneficiary. 13 The Crippled
Children Services Act 3 9 provides for grants to cover the cost of
medical treatment and services if the child is diagnosed as handi-
capped when relinquished for adoption. 40 These grants are avail-
able regardless of the adopting parents' income, resources, or ability
to pay.141 Also available is temporary financial help for parents
who adopt hard-to-place children.142 Under the new Aid for the
133. C. Haughey & D. Holland, The Adoption Services Section of the San
Diego Department of Public Welfare 11, Dec. 21, 1974 (unpublished paper
on file in the office of the San Diego Law Review).
134. Actually, however, there are two different adoption supply-and-
demand situations-one applies to the white non-handicapped
child, another to the "child with special needs" or the "hard-to-
place child"-the nonwhite child, the older child, the handicapped
child. The largest group of hard-to-place children is composed of
nonwhite children. According to the Child Welfare League, in 1971
there were 133 approved adoptive homes available for every 100
white adoptive children, but only 71 approved homes for 100 non-
white children. KADUSHIN 528.
135. The Legislature's understanding of the problem faced by handi-
capped children is reflected in the Legislative Statement of Purpose:
It is the purpose of this chapter to encourage and promote the
placement in adoptive homes of children who because of their eth-
nic background, race, color, language, physical or mental, or emo-
tional -or medical handicaps, or age or because they are a sibling
group who should be placed in the same home have become diffi-
cult to place in adoptive homes.
It is the legislative intent to make available to prospective adoptive
parents information concerning the availability of relinquished
children, information and assistance in completing the adoption
process, and the financial aid which might be required to enable
them to adopt an otherwise hard-to-place child. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 16117 (West 1972).
136. These are the Crippled Children Services Act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE, § 270 (West 1970) and the Aid for the Adoption of Children
Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 16116, 16120 (West 1972).
137. See note 135 supra.
138. The epileptic child falls well within the definition of the handi-
capped child contained in each of these laws. See note 111 supra.
139. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 270 (West 1970).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE, § 16120 (West 1972).
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Adoption of Children Act,143 the adopting parents receive funds
that would otherwise be paid for foster parent care of the child.144
This assistance is available for up to three years.
145
These innovative4 6 programs do more than encourage the adop-
tion of epileptic children. They foster early placement of such chil-
dren, promoting a secure parent-child relationship. Each program
demonstrates that a small investment of funds on a temporary basis
can make it possible for many children to find a family of their own,
with all the security and value that family life brings. From Jan-
uary 1, 1969, to December 31, 1970, a total of 1,267 children were
placed in adoptive homes as a result of the Aid for Adoption pro-
gram; 182 children were placed as a result of the Crippled Children
Services Act. All these children had one or more characteristics
which qualified them for consideration under the program. Past
experience of adoption agencies, both public and private, substanti-
ate that essentially all these children would have remained in long-
term foster care unless given assistance by these legislative acts.
1 47
Additionally, results of the programs are solid evidence supporting
the thesis that adoptive families are able to accept as their own
children who are physically or mentally handicapped. The pro-
grams also educate the public about the reality faced by children
living with epilepsy, thereby reducing individual and societal prej-
udices. Finally, they serve as successful examples to other states
and countries1 48 that a mechanism does exist to enhance the possi-
bility that an epileptic child's needs can be met. Realistically, nei-
ther the state nor society can guarantee a family to a homeless,
handicapped child. They can, however, make the child placement
process as conducive to achieving that objective as California has at-
tempted.
The biggest boon to the homeless epileptic child, however, is the
recent legislative action deleting epilepsy as a basis for vacating
143. Id. §§ 16116, 16120 (West 1972).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. These programs were among the first of their kind in the country.
Other states and countries have requested information about the programs.
DEPARTMENT or SocIAL WELFARE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
ON THE AID FOR THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN PROGRAVE (1971) (on file in the
office of the San Diego Law Review).
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 1.
an adoption.149 This amendment has particular significance for the
adoptable infant. Epilepsy does not always manifest itself soon
after birth. Typically, seizures may occur when the child is a tod-
dler or a pre-schooler. Today, parents who discover their adopted
child is subject to seizures cannot vacate the adoption.150 By adopt-
ing, they succeeded to all the rights and duties within the ambit
of biological parents.15' Responsibility for the child's physical and
emotional well-being cannot be lessened by the child's subsequent
physical infirmity. At no time in the past could adopting parents
vacate an adoption for other potentially catastrophic physical ill-
nesses such as polio, heart disease, or diabetes. Only the physical
disorder, epilepsy, was singled out for this treatment. The sole ra-
tionale for such a classification was the mistaken belief that epi-
lepsy is a form of insanity, or even something much worse.' 2 Med-
ical facts have proved the falsity of this presumption. In its impact
upon the family, the epilepsies are no different from other ailments.
In fact, the probability the child may outgrow his epilepsy, or, at
least, effectively control it, holds for the entire family the very real
possibility the child's life will be full and reasonably normal. Fur-
thermore, by reinforcing the parents' duties, the family setting is
preserved, and the child reaps the benefit. 53
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 227b (West Supp. 1975). In 1972, the legislature
eliminated the word epileptic from the provision, rewriting it to read that
an adoption could be vacated only if the child shows evidence of mental
deficiency or mental illness, to such an extent that the child is considered
unadoptable.
The effect of this change is to eliminate epilepsy in the child as a basis
for vacating adoption. Also, the vacation of an adoption for reasons of men-
tal deficiency or mental illness must meet the new statutory standard of
unadoptability. To date there have been no cases interpreting this new
statute. But in the recent past the courts have demonstrated their willing-
ness to vacate an adoption. See, e.g., Department of Social Welfare v. Su-
perior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 459 P.2d 897, 900, 81 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (1969).
Also there are no legislative hearings documenting the legislature's intent
or defining the terms mental deficiency, mental illness, or unadoptable.
ASSEMVBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFoRNIA LEGISLATURE, HEAINGS AND RE-
PORTS OF CommavcsTEEs OF THE CALIFoRNIA LEGISLATURE DURING 1972: A Sum-
MARY AND LISTING 53 (Nov. 1973). See also text accompanying note 120
supra.
150. CAL. Civ. CODE § 227b (West Supp. 1975). See also note 149 supra.
151. O'Dell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 228 (West 1954).
152. See text accompanying note 189 infra.
153. The parents are not without assistance upon discovering their child
has epilepsy. Under the Crippled Children Services Act they have free di-
agnostic services at their disposal as well as financial assistance for the
treatment of their child if they cannot finance all or part of the child's treat-
ment. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 249, 250, 253.5, 255 (West 1970); 17
CAL. ADM. CODE § 2903 (1967), § 2904 (1967). The parents may also call
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With the abolition of the adoption vacation statute, the child is
protected from a potentially damaging disruption of the parent-
child relationship. Nevertheless, one argument advanced against
such legislative action is that forcing parents to keep a child they
do not want will be just as damaging to the child as the potential
disruption. Another argument is that the epileptic child had been
benefitted by the vacation statute because it could be freed from
the resentment of its parent and, now, this route to freedom is
closed. To these arguments there are a number of responses: The
resentment a parent may feel toward the child is in itself misplaced.
It stems from a misunderstanding of epilepsy and the stigma at-
tached to it. Notwithstanding this however, the parent may still
harbor a damaging attitude. When the attitude is severe or ex-
treme and results in abuse or neglect of the child, the state can
act to remove it from the parent. 5 4 When the attitude is not so
severe as to warrant state action, the child may be unloved. Thus,
the issue is whether running the risk that an epileptic child will
be unloved is a worthwhile price to pay for legislative action de-
signed to protect the child's access to a home and family. Although
the resolution of this issue is necessarily colored by one's own value
preferences, what evidence there is indicates the risk is a worth-
while one to take.155 The Aid to Crippled Children Act and the
Aid for the Adoption of Children Act are evidence for the proposi-
tion adoptive parents are able to accept such children as their
own.15 Moreover, the parent is not without significant administra-
tive and medical resources to deal with the child's epilepsy.
157 Fi-
nally, a child's early life is a risk whether raised by biological par-
ents or by adoptive parents. The attitude toward the epileptic child
from either kind of parent cannot be predicted. Thus, striking the
balance so as to protect the child's access to a family is clearly the
reasonable choice.
Absent legislation of this type, a child who had known only one
set of parents could lose those parents and suffer an unnecessary,
potentially damaging separation. Unreasonable discrimination
upon the resources of the Epilepsy Foundation of America and its local
chapters. Hearings on H.R. 13405, supra note 1, at 37.
154. See note 103 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
156. Id.
157. See note 153 supra.
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based upon the existence of a physical defect was unwittingly fos-
tered, if not condoned. 'Clearly, the legislature's action did not
withdraw a protection or prerogative from the parent; rather, it
restored to the infant epileptic its right to a family by eliminating
an anachronistic, unjustifiably discriminatory statute. No longer
will the epileptic child be treated differently from other children
with physical disorders.
Efforts to bring an epileptic person into full citizenship begin only
with passage of progressive child placement laws; they cannot end
there. As epileptic children grow older, they face handicaps beyond
those that burden their bodies. Exploration and discussion of such
problems begin in the subsequent section on the epileptic parents'
ability to retain custody of their own child or to adopt a child.
The Epileptic Parent
In spite of efforts to provide for adoption of epileptics,6 8 no
equivalent effort exists to facilitate adoptions by epileptics. For
childless, seizure-controlled epileptics pursuing vigorous lives, the
situation is distressing. Set apart by epilepsy, these people may
ultimately be prevented from adopting although they exhibit what
otherwise would be admirable qualities in adopting parents.
Everyone desiring to adopt a child undergoes a background in-
vestigation.159 This inquiry compiles data for evaluation of the ap-
plicant,160 and, along with the pre-adoptive interview, 1" allows the
agency to decide the applicant's suitability as a prospective par-
ent.1 62 An essential element of the investigation is the status of
158. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
159. 22 CAL. ADm. COPE §§ 30637, 30689 (1972).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 30633.
162. Id. § 30643.
What life in a home is like under the surface is of the greatest im-
portance to a child since his future happiness and attitudes are
largely determined by his early experiences. Therefore, in evaluat-
ing the prospective adoptive family, the agency needs to know
whether the adoptive parents are mature adults capable of easy and
loving relationships, secure enough in their marriage to share their
love with a child 6 other parents, to face life's difficulties coura-
geously, and to take the risks involved in adoptive parenthood will-
ingly.
The purpose of the adoptive home study is not just to evaluate
the applicants and their potentialities for growth and parenthood,
but also to help prepare them for what is coming and the inevitable
changes which will occur when a child enters the family. Some-
times adoptive applicants have not thought through what it will
mean to them to share their life with a child. Smith, Adoptive
Services as Related to Adoptive Families: Introduction, in RFnA-
iNGS iN ADOPTioN 258, 261-62 (1963). See generally KAuusH.
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the applicant's health.163 In order to obtain the applicant's medical
records, the agency requires a signed medical release..64 Unless the
applicant makes a concerted effort to conceal his epilepsy, the
agency will quickly be made aware of its existence and the extent
to which it is controlled. 65
Agencies must select couples who appear to have the ingredients
necessary for a good relationship with the child not only as an in-
fant, but also as it grows older.166 These ingredients range from
such definitive and objective standards as age, health, marital
status, and religion to the ambiguous and subjective measurement
of emotional health, capacity for parenthood, motive for adoption,
and the quality of the marital relationship. 167 Each ingredient,
163. 22 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 30637, 30689 (1972). For the purpose and ra-
tionale of the health requirement, see text accompanying notes 174-76
infra.
164. 22 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 30635, 30705 (1972).
165. It is probably in the adopting couple's best interest to tell the case
worker of the existence of the epilepsies. If the fact is hidden then subse-
quently discovered, the case worker will wonder about the couple's failure
to speak and may come to the conclusion that the existence of the epilepsies
creates other problems beyond the physical disability. As Isaac has noted:
"In regard to any fact which a couple feel might be held against them, the
best defense is offense. The couple should bring it up promptly of their
own accord, adding 'We hope this won't be held against us.' They can then
concentrate on showing how well they have handled the experience or met
the skeleton." R. ISAAC, ADoPTnG A CHILD TODAY 7 (1965).
166. D. FANSHEL, QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES TO PARNT SELECTION (1962),
cited in Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values
in the Adoption of Children, 38 SOCIAL SERVIcE REV. 26 (1964).
167. 22 CAL. ADm. CODE § 30643 (1972); KADusHIN 528. Kadushin pro-
vides adequate explanations of each of the subjective and ambiguous cri-
teria.
A. Emotional Health:
Emotional health as stated in the adoption literature, implies,
among other things, a clear understanding of oneself, a relaxed
acceptance of all one's weaknesses and strengths, a minimum
of unresolved developmental conflicts, adequate enactment of prin-
cipal social roles, an ability to postpone gratification and to deny
self-gratification out of consideration for the needs of others, a flex-
ible conscience that can accept some failure, some occasional sinful-
ness without crippling guilt, a capacity to form satisfying and per-
manent interpersonal relationships, the ability to be independent
and yet be capable of dependency if it is objectively justified. It
is said that in order to be a happy parent one must first be a happy
person.
B. Capacity for Parenthood:
This factor is tied to the factor of emotional health, because the
emotionally healthy person supposedly possesses the essential pre-
requisites for competent parenthood. Yet capacity for parenthood
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when tested against agency standards, results in an evaluation of
whether the applicant evinces those attributes perceived as neces-
sary to properly perform as adoptive parents. Successful applicants
must demonstrate emotional and physical stability, economic secur-
ity, and an abundant capacity for parenthood.
168
Presently in California, the applicant-to-child ratio is extremely
high. 69 Consequently the selective criteria for eligibility are be-
goes beyond emotional health-it includes the capacity to love, ac-
cept, and offer emotional security to children; the capacity to per-
mit them to grow in terms of their own individuality; a readiness
to accept, understand, and meet the inevitable behavioral problems
of children. The good parent is flexible in his expectations and
is realistic in accepting the child's limitations; he accepts the child
as an end in himself rather than as a means toward some parent-
defined end; he likes children and enjoys them.
C. Quality of the Marital Relationship:
Although the length of time married says something about the
quality of the marriage, more than this needs to be assessed. Be-
cause the child is likely to be affected by the dynamics of marital
interaction, the agency would like to assess the degree of mutual
emotional satisfaction the applicants derive from their marriage.
Factors such as mutual participation in decision making (particu-
larly with reference to the decision to adopt), the extent to which
each of the partners comfortably accepts his sexual identification,
the degree of mutual sexual satisfaction, the acceptance of allocated
roles within the family-all are regarded as important considera-
tions. A happy family starts with a happy marriage.
D. Motives for Adoption:
The agency is also interested in the motives that have prompted
the applicant to apply for adoption. Some motives are regarded
by the agency as less desirable and more indicative of possible fu-
ture difficulty. In general, motives that focus on the needs of the
adoptive parents are regarded as less acceptable, more suspect,
than those that center on the needs of the child. However, the
same expressed motive can have a positive meaning as viewed in
terms of another couple's situation. A desire to help a child grow
may have positive connotations as expressed by an accepting, un-
derstanding couple; but in the case of a rigid, self-centered couple,
it may indicate a desire to push the child to fulfill the prospective
parents' needs and ambitions. Id. at 531-33.
168. See Maas, The Successful Adoptive Parent Applicant, 5 SOCIAL WORIC
14 (1960). Maas conducted a survey of adoptive agencies in nine com-
munities. His composite portrait of Jane and Harry Smith represents the
characteristics usually present in a successful adoptive applicant. Id. at 16.
169. See text accompanying note 129 supra. From the 1963-64 fiscal year
to the 1972-73 fiscal year there was a 43 percent decline in the number of
children relinquished for adoption. The number of independent adoptions
has decreased 56 percent. CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, TEN
YEAR TRENDS in THE ADOPTION PROGRAIVIS IN CALIFORNIA REP. No. 341-0472-
501, 1 (1973) (on file in the office of the San Diego Law Review).
Factors which may have contributed to the dramatic decline in re-
linquishment and independent adoptions are thought to be recent
social change such as more effective and more widespread use of
birth control methods such as the pill, the legalization of abortion
in the State, and less social pressure and the increased desire and
ability of unmarried parents to keep their children. Id.
At the same time, the potential demand for adoption has increased
as the large numbers of children born in the late 1940's and early
1950's began reaching the age of adoptive application and concern
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coming more stringent. 7 0 Agency discretion within the select
group of eligible parents is growing.17' Case workers 72 have at
their disposal a greater variety of requirements to be met. For
with population increase lead to growing acceptance of adoption
by fertile couples who deliberately choose not to bear their own
children. KADus=n 527.
170. Probably, the most significant factor determining agency practice
and procedure is the law of supply and demand. When the ratio of adop-
tive applicants to available children is low, the agency tends to modify or
eliminate various eligibility requirements. Kuusmnw 526.
The agency will maintain ideal standards as long as the supply of
fully qualified applicants who are ready to become adoptive par-
ents exceeds the supply of children. When the number of children
exceeds the number of fully qualified applicants, the agency will
lower its qualifications for adoptive parents. Just as there is a
limit beyond which the applicant prefers to withdraw his applica-
tion rather than to lower his preference any further, so too there
is a limit beyond which the agency is reluctant to lower its stand-
ards in order to accept progressively less qualified applicants.
Kadushin, A Study of Adoptive Parents of Hard-to-Place Children, 43
SociAL CASEWORK 227 (1962). Modification of standards will be made
initially in qualifications having little or no functional importance for an
effective performance as an adoptive parent. For example,
religion in this sense is a non-functional qualification for parent-
hood. One can effectively discharge the functions of parenthood
as either a Protestant or an agnostic. Emotional stability, however,
is a functional qualification. Hence, the adoption agency is likely
to be more willing to accept a couple with different religious back-
grounds than it is to accept an emotionally unstable couple. Id.
at 231.
When the ratio is high, the agency can be extremely selective in choosing
who will become a parent to a child. Criteria for acceptable applicants
become more stringent, and agency discretion in placement increases pro-
portionately. Thus, during periods when the applicant-to-child ratio is
high, both the selectivity criteria and the power of the agency to place chil-
dren within the select group increase.
171. Id.
172. Case workers, more out of necessity than lack of qualified appli-
cants, are forced to reject many who wish to adopt. In theory, their deci-
sion is based upon objective standards applied with professional skill.
Michales, Casework Considerations in Rejecting the Adoption Application,
in READINGS IN ADOpTION 307-08 (1963). In reality, however, it is ex-
tremely difficult to excise personal values from the decision-making proc-
ess. Reid, supra note 112, at 6. Case workers are human. They have their
own prejudices and values. Consequently, their attitude about an accept-
able adoptive prospect tends to solidify. D. HUTCHINSON, CHERISH THE
CmLD 82 (1972). The resultant loss of flexibility eliminates from considera-
tion those whose life-styles, demeanor, personality or health status are
contra to the caseworker's ideal. Examples of this rigid use of criteria are
highlighted in the writings of a noted commentator:
I knew one homefinder who could never approve a home where
there was a dog; one who could not accept foster parents who slept
in twin beds; another who did not like double beds; some who al-
ways ruled out people over a certain age; others who frowned upon
divorcees and widows. Id. at 120.
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example, discovery of a potential health problem in an applicant
might serve as a safe shield from behind which a case worker could
eliminate the applicant from consideration, even when the health
problem is dormant, or, as in the case of the epileptic, controlled.
This practice may well transform epilepsy into a barrier to eligibil-
ity,173 compounding further the stigma already attached to the epi-
leptic's every sojourn into society's mainstream. In competition
with others not subject to seizures, the epileptic has been virtually
priced out of the market.
Agencies require assurances of good health principally to insure
the child against loss of another set of parents.174 Not surprisingly,
controlled seizures are consistent with this objective. Because epi-
leptics' life expectancy is not greatly different from the norm,'175
chances of their living with and providing for the child are equal to
those of "healthy" parents.
Another rationale for the good health requirement is the protec-
tion of the child's economic well-being. 7 6 This is a valid concern.
Obviously, the parent is obligated to provide adequate clothing,
shelter, food, and educational opportunities for the child. These
obligations can be met by epileptic people, for they are fully capable
of working and earning a good wage.177 Also, the chance epileptics
will be disabled on their job is no greater than that of others be-
cause epileptics perform their tasks as safely as the average
worker. 1 Due to unreasonable discrimination which plagues the
173. The practice of denying epileptics the privilege to adopt exists. Re-
cently, an epileptic mother wrote about her experiences in attempting adop-
tion:
This doctor not only treated my disease, but also my ability to
cope with other people's reactions. I began to see myself as a per-
son with many good qualities as well as some not so good, and
to view epilepsy as a minor rather than the supreme part of my
life.
Unfortunately, the adoption agencies didn't seem to agree. In
spite of their telling Con and ne that we had "all the right qualifi-
cations," we were turned down by every agency we applied to.
O'Donovan, A Young Mother's Story, REDBooK, Apr. 15, 1976, at 48.
174. "The physical and mental health of the adoptive applicants is im-
portant to ensure a child parents with reasonable life expectancy, the ability
to care for him, and the security of having parents until he reaches matur-
ity." Smith, Adoptive Services as Related to Adoptive Families: Introduc-
tion, in RlADnxGs nv ADoprioN 258, 262 (1963). See also KADUSHMn 530.
175. BARRow 21; Hearings on H.R. 13405, supra note 1, at 55 (statement
of Dr. David D. Daley, President, International League against Epilepsy).
176. KADUSHIN 530.
177. See Birdsall v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 140 (D. Colo. 1933) (The
court took judicial notice of the fact that many men in various walks of
life, with epilepsy, are earning a living.).
178. BmARow 70.
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epileptic, there is, among epileptics, a greater percentage of unem-
ployed than in the general population. 179 This fact is of little conse-
quence, however, if the applicant is working and meets the agency's
economic requirements. Besides, one form of discrimination ought
not perpetuate another.
The physical manifestation of the disorder is no barrier to pro-
viding for the child's everyday needs. It is doubtful a seizure would
occur so long as the parent takes the prescribed medication and
follows the required regimen. 18 0 However, if a seizure does occur,
the physical consequences are slight. The parent is incapacitated
for a relatively short while-only during the time the seizure runs
its course. After that, the parent is able to resume activities.' 8 '
Also, the epileptic parent's mate is aware of the partner's predispo-
sition to seizure. Certainly, prior plans to deal with the situation
would be made.
The most emotional, and thus perhaps the strongest, argument
against permitting an adoption by an epileptic is not that the dis-
order physically prevents the parent from caring for the child;
rather it is that the child will have an adverse reaction to the sei-
zure and will be emotionally scarred by witnessing it.182 When
faced with this issue, courts recognize the child may witness a sei-
zure; yet, that fact alone is not sufficient to spirit the child away
from its epileptic parent. 8 3 More than is generally realized, chil-
dred have the capacity to cope with a variety of extraordinary
situations. 8 4 Witnessing an epileptic seizure is not necessarily
179. The unemployment rate among epileptics is now six times higher
than the national average. S. REP. No. 94-29, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (1975).
180. See text accompanying note 247 infra.
181. As one epileptic mother describes:
I simply black out for a few minutes, wake-up and then spend a
few seconds getting my wits about me before resuming whatever
I had been doing before.
O'Donovan, supra note 173, at 46.
182. Adoption of Martin, 76 Cal. App. 2d 133, 172 P.2d 552 (1946).
183. Id. at 137, 172 P.2d at 554.
184. See J. BOWLBY, II ATTAcHMIENT AND Loss 5-6 (1973); A. Freud
Child Observation and Prediction Development-A Memorial Lecture in
Honor of Ernst Kris, 13 PSYCHONMALYTIC STUDY OF THE Cnna, 953-54 (1958);
Hellman, Hempstead Nursery Follow-Up Study, 17 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY
OF THE CinLD 159-74 (1962); J. & J. Robertson, Young Children in Brief
Separation, 26 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 264-315 (1971); Note,
The Lesbian Mother, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799 (1975).
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traumatic to a child, especially if its parent has explained the mani-
festations of the disorder with candor and love. One adoptive 85
epileptic mother has written:
Many people ask how my girls have adapted to my disease. It
is undeniable that it has affected them, but not always for the
worse. At an early age my daughters learned to have compassion
for the difficulties and differences of others.
I am proud of my children's reaction to my epilepsy. Anne deals
calmly with my seizures and will hold my hand or cushion my
head during a blackout. Once I had a blackout while cooking
breakfast, and she had the presence of mind to turn off the
burner. 8 6
In addition the child would not be exposed to any extraordinary
physical danger. For instance, epileptics present very little risk of
harm to co-workers.18 7  Moreover, children of school age spend
many hours in school away from the parent. Also, a parent might
well be warned of the seizure by an aura and take refuge. Most
importantly, the majority of epileptics are totally controlled. For
these people no reason exists to deprive them of the privilege of
adopting.
The tragedy, of course, is that arbitrary placement of epileptics
into a health risk category effectively minimizes their opportunity
to adopt. The epileptic is denied what is available to other appli-
cants-the right to be evaluated as a human being capable of loving
185. Pat O'Donovan tried for years to adopt a child from adoption agen-
cies. Although she and her husband exhibited all the right qualifications,
they were turned down by every agency. See note 173 supra. Eventually
the O'Donovans adopted two children by private means with the help of
an attorney. O'Donovan, id.
186. Id.
187. Recent studies have shown that epileptic workers, when placed
in jobs that take their impairment into account, have an accident
experience and performance record that compares favorably with
that of unimpaired workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 1948; Udel,
1960; Lorbeer and Barron, 1958). In one such study the accident
records of epileptic and unimpaired workers were compared, and
it was found that the rate of nondisabling injuries of epileptic and
unimpaired workers was 5.5 and 4.4 respectively. The difference
in rates is not statistically significant. A comparison of disabling
injuries indicated that the frequency rate for the epileptic worker
was slightly higher than that for the unimpaired group. This dif-
ference, however, amounted to less than 1 injury per million ex-
posure hours, and it did not appear statistically significant. Epi-
leptic workers were found to be equally as reliable in work attend-
ance as the unimpaired group (U.S. Department of Labor, 1948).
Other studies have also shown that, under the methods by which
workmen's compensation insurance premiums are calculated, it is
highly unlikely that the cost of such coverage would be increased
by hiring epileptic workers (Eilers and Melone, no date (b)).
Finesilver, Legal Aspects of Epilepsy, in EPILEPSY REHABILITATION
60 (1975).
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a child as one's own with compassion, acceptance, and understand-
ing. 88 The presence of controlled epilepsy in an applicant holds
little relation to the fundamental questions at issue in the adoption
proceeding: Will this applicant provide an emotionally stable, eco-
nomically secure home for a child? Has the prospective parent a
capacity for parenthood? Certainly the mere existence of con-
trolled epilepsy does not command a negative answer. Epilepsy
does not adversely affect one's ability to love and care for a child.
Moreover, emotional difficulties do not automatically follow a phys-
ical disorder.8 9 In fact, if a person has had to cope with a disorder
and has done so successfully without incurring emotional problems,
this should be clear evidence of ability to deal effectively with ad-
verse situations. It adds credence to the inference that this person
is capable of raising an adoptive child.190
When the question is not the fitness of a person to adopt a child,
but rather fitness to keep a child, courts have not viewed epilepsy
in the custodian as the crucial determinant.' 9 ' In a recent New
188. Epileptic people have an unrestricted right to a biological family.
This right is secure, protected in large measure by our legal history, social
mores, and to a certain extent constitutional safeguards. They can marry,
procreate, and raise a family as they see fit, unencumbered by rules or laws
different from those which govern the lives of others. See text accompany-
ing note 94 supra. Furthermore, courts do not deprive epileptic parents
of custody of their child solely because of seizure predisposition. See text
accompanying note 191 infra. Yet, when faced with adoption proceedings
the epileptics' chances of successfully adopting are slim.
189. Epilepsy is not a form of insanity. Some cases which recognize the
fact that the epilepsies do not constitute a form of insanity include People
v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 66, 198 P.2d 865, 873 (1948) (epilepsy is not an
insanity defense); In re Dach's Guardianship, 272 Wis. 120, 74 N.W.2d 766
(1956) (the court refused to take judicial notice that epileptic people are
hopeless). Although throughout history epileptics were categorized as
feeble-minded or insane, medical fact has destroyed this myth. See text
accompanying note 65 supra.
190. A noted authority on child welfare and placement agrees with this
view.
The point overlooked is that many healthy people who wish to
adopt a baby have lived through unhealthy experiences. The crux
of the matter is not necessarily the unhealthy experience itself, but
what the person has done with his life in spite of this experience:
whether he now enjoys release from its traumatic effects or
whether he is still chained by its power over him; whether the
problem has evaporated or whether its infection is still a source of
psychic irritation and suffering. D. HUTCHINSON, CHERISH THE
CHnD 83 (1972).
191. Epileptic parents are rarely denied the custody of their biological
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York case, a trial court refused to deprive the parents-both epilep-
tics-of custody of their six-month old child.192 State welfare offi-
cials argued that the child would not be properly cared for.0 3 Not-
ing that no harm had befallen the mother's now teenage daughters
from a previous marriage, the judge ruled against the State.194 Sim-
ilarly, custody was returned to an epileptic mother in an Iowa case
even though her husband contended epilepsy prevented the woman
from being able to adequately provide for the children.0 5  The
court rejected this contention, saying:
So far as the welfare of the children is concerned ... there seems
no reasonable ground for apprehension as to their safety or welfare
while committed to her care and custody even though she should
experience a recurrence of the ... disorder [the epilepsies] from
which she previously suffered. 196
Finally, in Adoption of Martin,197 a California appellate court re-
jected the claim that a child would detrimentally suffer by observ-
ing its mother's seizures. The child's mother, after the untimely
death of her husband, voluntarily relinquished her child for adop-
tion by her parents, with whom she lived. The paternal grandpar-
ents contested the adoption arguing that "the young children of
a woman who suffers occasional spells of epilepsy should not be
permitted to live in the home with her if another entirely suitable
home can be provided for them."0 8  The appellate court disagreed.
The advantages that would accrue to the child through being reared
in the home of its maternal grandparents and in the society of her
mother outweighed the disadvantages. 199
Existence of epilepsy in a prospective parent is not at odds with
the agency requirement of good health. An epileptic whose seizures
are controlled is in good health, and is not handicapped. Such a
person is as capable of loving a child as one who is seizure free.
children. Courts recognize the epilepsies are a physical disorder, having
little influence on the parent's capacity to successfully care for a child. In
cases in which custody is denied, the decision turns on factors such as the
custodian's inability to provide for the child's economic well-being or main-
tain an emotionally stable environment rather than on the existence of epi-
lepsy alone. Further, if epilepsy is the only evidence "adverse" to the cus-
todian's right to custody, this presence alone is insufficient to terminate the
custodial right. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
192. Schultz, Four Million Americans Should Not Have to Lie About
Their Health, TODAY'S HEALTH, Sept. 1975, at 16-17.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Wood v. Wood, 220 Iowa 441, 262 N.W. 773 (1935).
196. Id. at 443, 262 N.W. at 775.
197. 76 Cal. App. 2d 133, 172 P.2d 552 (1946).
198. Id. at 137, 172 P.2d at 554.
199. Id. at 136, 172 P.2d at 554.
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This is not to say, however, an agency should overlook the pres-
ence of the epilepsies in a prospective parent. Such a view would
be unreasonable. But the epileptic must be judged fairly. 200  To
this end, judicial response to evidence of the epilepsies should be
followed by adoption agencies. The evidence should be a factor
in consideration, but if it is the only evidence adverse to the pro-
spective parents' eligibility, it ought not be sufficient to deprive
them of the chance to adopt. The agency must consider the charac-
ter of the seizures, the extent to which they are controlled, and
the time since the last occurrence. The agency must not be blinded
by the parent's physical disorder to such an extent that it does not
seek to discover whether the parent would provide a warm, emo-
tionally stable, and economically secure home for a child.
Summary: The Epileptic and the State-Decreed Family
To this point, analysis has focused upon the external impact epi-
lepsy exerts on those who choose to have a biological family and
on those who participate in an adoption proceeding or custody hear-
ing. As has been shown, California law protects the epileptic
adult's right of choosing to marry and to raise a child. Further,
it appears the right of child custody is not jeopardized solely be-
cause the parent exhibits seizure predisposition. However, an epi-
leptic adult's chances of acquiring a state-decreed family through
the adoption process are slim. Unless adoption agencies follow an
administrative procedure analogous to the judicial considerations
applied in a custody hearing, an epileptic adult is effectively de-
prived of the adoption privilege. But although the epileptic adult
experiences difficulty in adopting, the epileptic children up for
adoption are not so unfortunate. Legislative and administrative ac-
tions to foster and encourage their adoption have enhanced adoption
prospects considerably.
In the subsequent section the focus is different. Again, the sub-
ject is the epileptic who is taking medication for the seizure condi-
200. Social reaction to epileptic people remains one of distrust and fear
predicated upon a stereotyped image of epilepsy which is inaccurate and
misleading. The result is discrimination rooted in unnecessary prejudice.
For a general discussion of the stigma of epilepsy, see Hearings on H.R.
13405, supra note 1, at 35-42 (statement of Paul E. Funk, Executive Vice
President, Epilepsy Foundation of America).
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tion and who has established an acceptable level of seizure control.
But the arena of inquiry shifts to civil liability. The issue is the
extent of duty an epileptic owes to others once the epileptic
is aware of seizure predisposition.
Civil Liability
The Issue
Tort actions for negligence raise the issue of whether an individ-
ual has a civil duty to another. Judicial inquiry seeks to as-
certain if a legal obligation exists to conform one's conduct to a
standard of reasonable care. 201 This legal obligation is called duty.
If the actor is found to be under a duty, inquiry then turns to
whether the duty has been breached, and, if so, whether the breach
is a proximate cause of the injured party's damages.
20 2
Under common law, the necessary predicate for the existence of
duty is foreseeability of harm to the person injured. If the actor's
conduct can foreseeably cause injury to the victim, the foundational
element for duty is established.20 3 The converse is true also. For
example, when one drives an automobile, 20 4 a duty of reasonable
care to prevent an accident arises. But if the driver unforeseeably
loses consciousness, the duty of reasonable care is not breached, for
he cannot reasonably be expected to prevent that which he can not
anticipate or control.205 "In such event the very foundation of neg-
201. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAw or TORTs § 53, at 324 (4th ed.
1971).
202. The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: duty, breach
of duty, proximate cause, and damage. See id. at 143.
203. The foreseeable risk of harm to another is necessary to establish lia-
bility. Id. But, foreseeability is not the only criteria giving rise to a duty.
Other considerations might include: (1) the administrative factor; (2) the
ethical and moral factor; (3) the economic factor; (4) the prophylactic
factor; and (5) the justice factor. For a discussion of these factors, and
duty in negligence cases generally, see Green, The Duty Problem in Neg-
ligence Cases, 28 COLum. L. REV. 1014, 1034 (1928) and Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases II, 29 CoLUm. L. REV. 255 (1929). For a cri-
tique of the Green view, see Bohlen, Book Review, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 781.
The California Supreme Court recognizes foreseeability is not the only cri-
terion in establishing the existence of duty. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
204. The discussion for the remainder of the article will focus upon the
epileptic's duty when using an automobile. An automobile is generally con-
sidered a dangerous instrumentality when operated. Because of the auto-
mobile's nature, the duty of care in its use is high. It follows that the duty
established in automobile cases and the standard of care to be met could
be applicable in cases not involving dangerous instrumentalities. Certainly,
in such cases the duty of care would not be higher, and, if circumstances
warranted, it could be lower.
205. The leading case applying this rule is Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820
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ligence-knowledge and hence foreseeability-is absent. ' 20 6  In
legal as well as lay terms, the event is an "unavoidable accident.
'20 7
Thus liability does not attach when control is suddenly and unfore-
seeably lost because the driver is overtaken by a sneeze,20 8 a heart
attack, 19 or a fainting spell.
210
This well-recognized rule, consistent with a theory of liability
based on fault, 211 affords a defense to those who without warning
suffer sudden unconsciousness.2 12 However, such a defense is un-
available to epileptics who are aware of their seizure predisposition.
Because of past seizures, future seizures are arguably foreseeable.
Consequently, under one application of the foreseeabiity test, a few
courts have held that awareness of a predisposition to epilepsy es-
tablishes liability when a seizure is a cause in fact of the injuries
inflicted. As stated in Malcolm v. Patrick:
21 3
For anyone who knows himself to be epileptic ever to drive a car
is ... unforgivable.
214
Other examples of the Malcolm position exist. In Eleason v. West-
ern Casualty & Surety Co.,2 1 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, con-
fronted with a statute prohibiting epileptics from driving, held it
was negligence "as a matter of law" for an epileptic to drive a ve-
hicle knowing he was subject to seizure. The Court of Appeals of
New York in People v. Eckert21 6 and People v. Decina 17 sustained
(D.C. Cir. 1933). The Cohen rule has been expressly adopted in California.
Ford v. Carew & English, 89 Cal. App. 2d 199, 203, 200 P.2d 828, 830 (1948);
Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 792, 131 P.2d 588,
590 (1942).
206. Bridges v. Speer, 79 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1955).
207. See PROSSER, supra note 202, at 140.
208. Zabunoff v. Walker, 192 Cal. App. 2d 8, 13 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1961).
209. Ford v. Carew & English, 89 Cal. App. 2d 199, 200 P.2d 828 (1948).
210. Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
211. For a discussion of fault, see PROSSER, supra note 202, at 16-19.
212. Typically, plaintiff has established a prima facie case. With the
facts of the accident and the injuries having been shown, the plaintiff is
entitled to a presumption of negligence. Unless the defendant can overturn
the presumption with a showing of an unforeseeable, sudden loss of con-
sciousness, liability is declared and damages assessed. Malcolm v. Patrick,
147 So. 2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1962); accord, Ford v. Carew & English, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 199, 200 P.2d 828 (1948).
213. 147 So. Zd 188 (Fla. 1962).
214. Id. at 193.
215. 254 Wis. 1, 35 N.W.2d 300 (1948).
216. 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956).
217. 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956).
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manslaughter indictments on the sole basis of awareness of a seizure
condition because driving an automobile with such knowledge went
beyond negligence sufficient for civil liability: It constituted reck-
less or culpably negligent conduct. 218  And in Golembe v. Blum-
berg,219 a father was held negligent for entrusting an automobile
to his son-a known epileptic-when the son experienced a seizure
while driving.
In each case, the court recognized awareness of the disorder's ex-
istence as equivalent to actual knowledge a seizure may recur.
Awareness fulfilled the foreseeability criterion, giving rise to a duty
of due care toward others. With this portion of the analysis there
can be little objection. Surely, epileptics ought to be under a duty
toward others when the potential for a seizure is present. A seizure
recurring while an automobile is being driven clearly heightens the
probability innocent parties may sustain injuries. Difficulty with
these cases exists not in the recognition of what gives rise to the
duty, but rather in the definition of what constitutes the duty once
it has arisen.
These and other similar cases 220 hold the duty of due care re-
quires abstention from driving, so negligence and recklessness arise
as soon as the epileptic begins to drive the automobile. 221 If a sei-
zure results in an accident causing injuries to others, the essentials
for a successful cause of action exist. Efforts made by the epileptic
to prevent seizure recurrence are no defense. Because the an-
nounced duty is to abstain completely from driving, efforts to pre-
vent seizure, even if proven, would appear to be wholly irrelevant.
218. The California rule is contra. See People v. Spragney, 24 Cal. App.
3d 333, 100 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1972); People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110,
141 P.2d 435 (1943).
219. 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941).
220. The few cases dealing with the issue of prior awareness of predispo-
sition to unconsciousness are collected at Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 12 (1953).
221. The court in People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157
N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956), held steadfastly to this point. The court reasoned that
because the driver was aware he was subject to seizure at any time, his
act was done in conscious disregard of others and therefore criminally pun-
ishable. As Judge Desmond's dissent clearly points out:
Just what is the court holding here? Not less than this: that a
driver whose brief blackout lets his car run amuck and kill another
has killed that other by reckless driving. But any such reckless-
ness consists necessarily not of the erratic behavior of the automo-
bile while its driver is unconscious, but of his driving at all....
Thus, it must be that such a blackout prone driver is guilty of reck-
less driving... , whenever and as soon as he steps into the driv-
er's seat of the vehicle. Every time he drives, accident or no acci-
dent, he is subject to criminal prosecution for reckless driving ....
Id. at 147-48, 138 N.E.2d at 809, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 572 (Desmond, J.,
dissenting).
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The rule's strictness probably turns on the fact that although the
epileptic defendant in each case had a seizure within a relatively
short period prior to the accident, he continued to drive.222 Because
foreseeability of recurrence was heightened by the immediately pre-
vious seizure, the courts established the duty as abstention from
driving, thus abolishing any defense predicated on the epileptic's
efforts to prevent seizures. But the courts have not been definitive
on whether awareness sufficient to give rise to foreseeability was
limited to awareness of the immediately previous seizure or aware-
ness of the existence of the disorder itself. In the former situation,
little objection exists to the result in each case. In the latter, stren-
uous objection can be interposed. Because many epileptics pres-
ently drive under state sanction,223 a judicial rule assessing liability
simply because a person is known to have epilepsy undermines re-
cent legislative successes in licensing epileptics. Furthermore, the
rule is blind to the status of medical advancements and medical
capabilities.
Surely, judicial rules should not exist in isolation. The medical
profession took the first steps to reduce the unnecessary discrimina-
tions of the past, causing legislatures to re-evaluate the laws affect-
ing epileptics. Although slowly, society has begun to correct its
mistaken view of the epileptic. This progressive movement toward
recognizing epileptics as more than second class citizens has the ef-
fect of placing the judiciary at a crossroads. The judiciary can
choose to stifle progress by adhering to the strict rule enunciated
above, or it can choose to recognize progress by adopting a more
flexible rule of civil duty which focuses upon the actual foreseeabil-
ity of seizure recurrence.
222. In Malcolm v. Patrick, 147 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1962), the defendant
admitted having dizzy spells prior to the accident.
In Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941), the
father did not contest the fact he knew the child had seizure predisposition.
In People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 132, 138 N.E.2d 794, 798, 157 N.Y.S.2d
551, 557 (1956), the defendant admitted a history of minor seizure episodes.
From the history, it is inferrable that seizures had occurred a relatively short
time before the accident.
However, in People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d
558 (1956), there is no indication whether the defendant had had a seizure
just prior to the accident. The court assumed the truth of the indictment
which said that defendant knew he was subject to seizure at any time. It
is this point that triggered Judge Desmond's dissent; see note 221 supra.
223. See text accompanying note 224 infra.
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Criticism of the Strict Rule
All state laws now provide some mechanism whereby the epilep-
tic is extended the driving privilege upon a showing of capability
to operate a motor vehicle with reasonable safety.224 Epileptics
who have obtained significant seizure control for a reasonable pe-
riod are objectively evaluated.22 Normally, the required seizure-
free period is two years, although some states have lowered the
requirement to one year.228 Once proof of the seizure-free period
has been established, the license is issued.227
This licensing procedure was adopted because motor vehicle ad-
ministrators recognized that a procedure which encouraged epilep-
tics to disclose their condition and submit to a fair evaluation of
driving ability was best calculated to reduce highway risks.228 Past
experience proved legislative prohibition of the epileptic's driving
privilege drove them underground. 229 Epileptics drove despite the
risk of civil liability or criminal penalty because economic and social
consequences from not driving were simply too costly.280 Epileptics
224. BARRow 58.
225. In California the licensing system for epileptics is as follows: When
the applicant is known to be epileptic, the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) is under legislative mandate either to refuse issuance of the license
or to revoke the license once issued. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 12805 (West
Supp. 1975) and CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13359 (West 1971). After the license
has been initially denied, the DMV conducts an investigation to determine
whether the driving privilege should be denied or issued under probation-
ary conditions. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 13800 (West Supp. 1975). Before the
license may be refused, however, a hearing must be conducted. CAL.
VEHICLE CODE, §§ 13950, 13951, 13953 (West 1971). The applicant is given
notice of the hearing. If the applicant fails to respond, the hearing is
waived. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 14103 (West 1971). The applicant can de-
mand either a formal hearing or an informal hearing. CAL. VEHICLE CODE,
§ 14100 (West 1971). A formal hearing is not permitted when the appli-
cant's objection to DMV action is based upon the results of a law test or
driving test. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 14102 (West 1971). A formal hearing
may be demanded, however, when the DMV action is based on the medical
or physical disability of the applicant. The hearings, findings and recom-
mendations are submitted to the DMV Director, or to an employee at the
level of Asst Division Chief who makes the final decision on issuance of
the license. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, § 14112 (West 1971).
226. BARRow 62 and 75-76. The American Medical Association recom-
mends a seizure-free period of two years before a license is issued. Id. at
63. Some states require a seizure-free period of one year. Id. at 73. Barrow
indicates that the experience of the states requiring only a one year seizure-
free period is as good as those states that require a longer period. Id. at
73-74.
227. See note 225 supra.
228. BAmow 58.
229. Id. 60-61.
230. The epileptic presently faces grave obstacles in obtaining a job and
earning a living. The current unemployment rate among epileptics is six
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either drove without a license or falsified the license application
by not disclosing the disorder.
23 1
The new licensing programs have been successful. Because epi-
leptics know a license will not be arbitrarily denied, fewer epileptics
go underground.232 Most accept the physical constraints of the dis-
order and comprehend the necessity for regulation and supervision
where the possible effect of a seizure may cause injury. As indi-
cated by Barrow and Fabing:
The value of adopting a fair, objective procedure is in reducing
greatly the proportion who conceal the condition and make an in-
dependent decision [to drivel.233
Moreover, the category of people included within medical proba-
tionary programs has been expanded. Whereas statutes had previ-
ously restricted the category to epileptics, others subject to loss of
consciousness, such as the diabetic and the heart patient, now fall
within its purview. 23 4  These achievements not only benefit the
public, but also help facilitate rehabilitation of the epileptic, equal-
times higher than the national average. See note 179, supra. Denial of the
driving privilege makes getting a job that much more difficult. The epilep-
tic is deprived of work requiring occasional use of an automobile or of jobs
located where the automobile is the only feasible means of transportation.
BARuow 59.
231. BARRow 61. In those states such as California, which obligate physi-
cians to notify state officials of persons with seizure conditions, the result
would be little different. The marginal epileptic would drive surrepti-
tiously even though the physician and the state are aware of the disorder's
existence, or the epileptic fails to inform the physician in the first place.
Id. 82.
In fact, some epileptics, to thwart compulsory disclosure, leave the state
to obtain treatment then return to drive within the state. Id. 83 n.50.
Whether or not a state statute that compels a physician to notify state
officials of all persons subject to lapses of unconsciousness serves to in-
crease traffic safety is open to question. Barrow and Fabing indicate it may
not. Id. For other objections to the physicians reporting statute, see
BAumow 77-83.
232. Id. at 62.
233. Id.
234. Until 1974 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 12805 Cc) (West 1971) applied only to
epileptics. In 1974 the statute was amended to include persons who have
a disorder characterized by lapses of unconsciousness. CAL. VEHIcLE CODE,
§ 12805(c) (West Supp. 1975).
This change is consistent with the findings of Dr. Julian A. Waller. In
a report presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of
Automotive Medicine on October 27, 1964, Dr. Waller concluded "that the
present emphasis on epilepsy as the major medical handicap to safe driving
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ize the administration of the laws, and reduce the stigma of epi-
lepsy.
The current judicial rule basing liability solely on the actor's
knowledge of the disorder's existence runs counter to these legisla-
tive and administrative efforts. Such a rule ignores the medical
advancements which stimulated legislative action granting epilep-
tics driver's licenses. Furthermore, it reinforces the stigma of
epilepsy by undermining efforts to encourage disclosure of the disor-
der, maintenance of a medical and physical regimen, and coopera-
tion with the state. Additionally, because meeting state legal and
medical requirements is no defense, the incentive to comply with
state regulation is removed. The situation is akin to the infamous
Catch 22;235 if an epileptic who is aware of seizure predisposition
does not meet any standards, liability attaches to an accident precip-
itated by a seizure; if the same epileptic meets state legislative,
administrative, and medical standards, liability attaches neverthe-
less.
The automobile is an essential, if not indispensable, part of our
way of life. Some would argue that driving is a conditional right
rather than a privilege.236 Nevertheless, the state's interest in traf-
is too narrow an approach." Waller, Chronic Medical Conditions and Traffic
Accidents 13 (1964) (on file in the office of the San Diego Law Review).
Doctors had been under an obligation since 1966 to report all people with
conditions characterized by unconsciousness to the Department of Health,
which in turn notified the Department of Motor Vehicles. This includes
diabetics and heart patients. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 410 (West
1970); 17 CAL. Anm. CODE § 2572 (1966). Prior to 1966 the statute pertained
to epileptics only. Cal. Stats., ch. 205, p. 850, § 9 (1951). But, notwith-
standing the new reporting statute, the statute automatically denying a li-
cense because of some physical disorder remained restricted to epileptics
until 1974. In that year the statute was amended to include all people sub-
ject to lapses of unconsciousness. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 12805 (West Supp.
1975). For eight years the epileptic was treated differently from the dia-
betic and the heart patient; yet, each were subject to the same symptom
that made them safety risks-loss of consciousness. Discrimination dies
slowly.
235. J. HELLER, CATCH 22 (1955).
236. BARRow 59. Other authors note the existence of the view that driv-
ing is a conditional right. See Pricer and Wyckoff, Practices and Proce-
dures of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1963).
Nevertheless, most states regard driving on the public highways as a priv-
ilege, rather than a right, and thus place on the applicant the burden of
proving his ability to drive safely. California holds this view. See id. at
357. But, the New Jersey statute is contra. It provides that a driver's
license may not be denied on the basis of a defect and places on the Director
of the Division of Motor Vehicles the burden of showing that the defect
renders the applicant incapable of driving safely. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39-
3-10 (1973).
It is within the states' police power to regulate the issuance of licenses,
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fic safety must be balanced against the individual's interest in the
automobile's use.23 7 A judicial ban on the driving privilege pre-
cludes any workable balance. It engenders the same response as
did the arbitrary ban previously adopted by the legislature. The
epileptic would again go underground. Consequently, the number
of marginal epileptic drivers would be greater, and the risks to
other motorists would be increased. Moreover, policing of marginal
epileptic drivers would be difficult. In all likelihood, their very
existence could not come to light until an accident occurred.
The Flexible Rule and How it Works
However, an alternative rule to civil liability is consistent with
both the traffic safety rationale and the recent actions by state offi-
cials. Essentially, the alternative or flexible rule is predicated on
a duty of seizure prevention when an epileptic attains the requisite
seizure control to be granted a license. Besides licensing, two other
elements comprise the standard of care-maintaining a medical and
physical regimen and cooperating with the attending physician.
The legal, as well as medical, effect of meeting the standard of care
is to reduce the foreseeability of seizure recurrence.
The flexible rule differs from its strict counterpart in that inquiry
must go beyond mere discovery of epilepsy in the driver. It must
seek to determine actual foreseeability of the specific seizure which
could precipitate an accident. Observance of the rule would be a de-
fense in an action for damages when injury results from a seizure.
For instance, if the epileptic is licensed, has been seizure-free for
two years, has maintained a medical and physical regimen, and in-
forms the doctor of any change in condition, a sudden seizure while
driving is virtually unforeseeable, notwithstanding the driver's
knowledge of epilepsy. The epileptic has done all that could be
done to prevent seizure. No inkling, premonition, or anticipation
People v. O'Neil, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 753-54, 401 P.2d 928, 931, 44 Cal. Rptr. 320,
323 (1965); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 806 (1968). Furthermore, the DMV's right
to not issue or to revoke licenses is constitutional. The Motor Vehicle Act
does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the DMV,
for the statute provides a complete and comprehensive guide to depart-
mental action. Beaman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 180 Cal. App. 2d
200, 4 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1960). The revocation or non-issuance of a license is
not a penal action. Its purpose is to make the streets and highways safe by
protecting the public from incompetence, lack of care, and wilful disregard
for the rights of others. Id. at 210, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
237. BARRow 123.
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of seizure is present. Except for awareness of controlled seizure
predisposition, such a case is hardly distinguishable from a classic
case of sudden unconsciousness. 238
Of course, if the licensed epileptic fails to maintain his medical
regimen, or has a seizure while not driving and does not disclose
the fact, or fails to meet the standard of care in some other way,
the prospect of seizure recurrence while driving is heightened. The
burden is on the epileptic to persuade the trier of fact that the
standard of care has been met and that the seizure was unforesee-
able.239 The duty of due care is placed firmly on the epileptic. But
under the flexible rule, the duty, although stringent, is not oppres-
sive and unworkable. It preserves traffic safety while providing
a reasonable defense to those with controlled seizure predisposition.
The argument against the flexible rule is that as between the
innocent victim and the epileptic driver whose unexpected seizure
was the cause of the injuries, the epileptic is less innocent, thus
more "responsible." Certainly, had it not been for the seizure, the
injuries might not have been inflicted. But the determination of
responsibility in a system of liability based on fault does not turn
on resolution of the question of cause in fact. Understandably, one
recoils at the thought that the injured party must bear the loss.
Nevertheless, in balancing between the person injured and the per-
son who without fault was the instrument of injury, courts uni-
versally hold for the latter.240 The tort system does not accommo-
date redress to all people injured by another: It accommodates only
those toward whom a duty has been breached. 241
Whenever presented, this redress of damages argument is not di-
rected at the issue of what constitutes the duty in a given case.
That plaintiff has been injured and seeks compensation raises the
question of liability; it does not begin to answer it. Essentially
this argument goes to the propriety of the tort system itself. But
whether another system of compensation ought to be adopted is
not the subject of this Note.242 The issue is and remains the extent
238. See text accompanying note 205 supra.
239. See note 212 supra.
240. See text accompanying note 205 supra.
241. See text accompanying notes 202-10 supra.
242. For a discussion of alternative systems of compensation for injuries
sustained in auto accidents, see R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEC-
TION FOR THE TRAFrIc VIcTIM; A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE IN-
SURANCE (1965); A Symposium on No-Fault Automobile Insurance-Per-
spectives on the Problems and Plans, 21 CATH. L. REV. 259 (1972); Sympo-
sium on No-Fault, 71 CoLUm. L. REv. 189 (1971); Symposium on No-Fault,
44 MISs. L.J. 1 (1973).
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of the epileptic's duty. As suggested earlier, the duty should con-
sist of licensing, maintenance of a medical and physical regimen,
and cooperation with the physician. A discussion of each of these
elements follows.
The Standard of Care
Licensing
Unquestionably, the licensing procedure does not in itself protect
the injured party from harm. The case law is replete with decisions
holding the existence or non-existence of a license to drive is not
determinative.243 The issue is the character of defendant's conduct
toward the plaintiff.244 This is true for the epileptic. Having the
license is not a fail-safe to accident occurrence. The epileptic might
still be liable for injuries resulting from a seizure even though a
license is possessed.
24 5
The licensing procedure is advocated, nevertheless, because it in-
creases greatly traffic safety.246 The effect of licensing is not to
absolve the epileptic of duties owed toward others; instead it indi-
cates seizure recurrence is less foreseeable. Consequently, if a sei-
zure recurs after a license has been issued, inquiry should focus
upon the actual foreseeability of the seizure which precipitated the
accident and not end because the person is discovered to be epilep-
tic.
Medical and Physical Regimen
Prevention of seizure recurrence requires that anti-convulsant
drugs be taken routinely and conscientiously. These drugs neutral-
243. For a compilation of the cases on this point, see Annot., 163 A.L.R.
1375 (1946).
244. A causal connection must exist between the absence of a license and
the injury inflicted. Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal. 2d 448, 458, 267 P.2d
303, 309 (1954).
245. The majority of cases holding a driver liable for awareness of a pre-
disposition to lose consciousness is based on facts indicating the driver lost
consciousness just previously to the accident but nevertheless continued to
drive. See text accompanying note 222 supra. See also Soule v. Grimshaw,
266 Mich. 117, 253 N.W. 237 (1934); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. 277, 81 A.2d
811 (1951) (Super. Ct. App. Div.). If the epileptic had a seizure while not
driving and decided to drive shortly thereafter, he would fall within the
purview of this rule. He would also be liable under the flexible rule because
he failed to adhere to the standard of care. See text accompanying note
238 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 228 supra.
1021
ize the affected area of the brain so that uneven electrical dis-
charges will not revert to full-fledged seizures. 247 For anti-con-
vulsants to work, the level of medication in the body must remain
constant. Failure to take medication one day-or the taking of a
double dose to make up for the previous day's failure-causes the
level of medication in the bloodstream to jump considerably. Un-
steadiness in the medication level can trigger some seizures, and
at the least increase the probability of seizure recurrence.248 The
epileptic must take the medication as instructed, as well as make
no attempt to limit or eliminate drug therapy without the approval
of his or her physician. Disregard in this respect is irresponsible.
The epileptic must also follow a physical regimen. As with the
kind and level of drug prescription, the exact type of such a regi-
men must be determined by consultation with a physician. Each
person is different and requires individual treatment. At the least,
however, epileptics should refrain from alcoholic beverages, keep
regular hours, get adequate sleep, and eat proper foods. 249 Alcohol,
by neutralizing or distorting the chemistry of anti-convulsants, can
precipitate seizures. 250 Inadequate sleep and diet control increase
seizure predisposition by lowering resistance.
2r1
Cooperation with the Doctor
Finally, epileptics must be honest with themselves and their doc-
tors. Their safety and the safety of others depend on this. Having
been initially attained through diagnosis by the doctor and treat-
ment with anti-convulsants, seizure control can best be sustained
by constant vigilance. Frequent visits coupled with electroenceph-
alograph monitoring of brain wave activity permit the doctor to
adjust drug therapy as needed and reduce the possibility of sei-
zure onset. However, failure by the epileptic to report any changes
in seizure activity increases the foreseeability of seizure onset.
Summary: Civil Liability
The defense of sudden unconsciousness is universally available
when the person rendered unconscious has no reason to anticipate
its onset. In a system of liability based on fault, the balance is
247. EPiLEPSY SocIETY OF SAN DIEGO, AN EPILEPSY MEDICATION HANDBOOK
1 (1975).
248. Id.
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struck in favor of the unforeseeably unconscious actor because no
duty toward the injured party is breached. When, however, the
actor is aware of seizure predisposition, a duty towards others
clearly exists. The standard of care to be met in such a situation
is one of two kinds. Courts can establish the duty of care strictly
as abstention from driving. Under such a rule epileptics are ex-
posed to civil liability each time they drive because they once were
subject to seizure. There is no defense to the action because the
breach of duty occurred when the epileptic drove. The alternative
is to establish the standard of care as one of seizure prevention
and to allow the epileptic to be licensed to drive. Under this rule,
seizure onset is unforeseeable unless the epileptic defendant
breached the duty to maintain a medical and physical regimen and
to cooperate with the attending physician. In fact situations in which
the epileptic has not had a seizure for an extended period and sei-
zure suddenly recurs rendering the epileptic unconscious while
driving, the defense is available. Because the flexible rule is con-
sistent with recent legislative and administrative actions, is founded
in a theory of liability based on fault, increases traffic safety, and
reflects medical fact, it should be adopted as the general judicial
rule.
CONCLUSION
The publication of Epilepsy and the Law caused legislatures to
amend many laws affecting the lives of epileptics. Nationwide, the
greatest changes occurred in laws pertaining to marriage, steriliza-
tion, and driver licensing.252 Interestingly enough, California had
no need to amend its laws in these areas. The epileptic never had
been denied the right to marry or to raise a family.2 5 3 Similarly,
the driving privilege had been extended whenever the epileptic
demonstrated the capability of being a safe driver.254 As suggested
earlier, however, access to these rights and privileges gave rise to
logical and reasonable corollaries.
The logical corollary of the right to choose a biological family
is a state-decreed family for those children and adults who do not
252. BARROW 30-56 and 57-89.
253. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
254. California had a procedure for licensing epileptics before publication
of Epilepsy and the Law. BARRow 57 & n.1.
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have biological families. As to this corollary, California responded
affirmatively with respect to epileptic children available for adop-
tion. Significant efforts are now being made in seeking homes for
such children. For the epileptic adult, however, the privilege to
adopt appears severely limited, if it exists at all.
A logical corollary to the driving privilege is a civil duty consis-
tent with the privilege to drive; that is, a rule focusing inquiry in
a civil action upon the actual foreseeability of the seizure precipi-
tating the accident. California case law is meager on the point.
In vehicular manslaughter cases, the actual foreseeability test is
used. 2 5 5 As has been advocated, the rule should be adopted in civil
cases as well.
Medical advancements in diagnosis and treatment of the epilep-
sies have changed the epileptic's life dramatically. Approximately
twenty years ago, society began to understand the effect of these
advancements. Thereafter, some changes in anachronistic laws oc-
curred almost immediately. But, although initial changes occurred,
the epileptic, nevertheless, is unnecessarily set apart. If the epilep-
tic ever is to exercise the rights and privileges of full citizenship,
the adjustment of social response to medical fact must continue.
GERARD SMOLIN, JR.
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255. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 141 P.2d 435 (1943). See
also People v. Spragney, 24 Cal. App. 3d 333, 100 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1972).
